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Article
The Revisability Principle
Andrew Tutt*
This Article has two purposes. The first is to explain the principle rooted in American law
and culture that most strongly supports an American right to be forgotten—a deep
constitutional commitment to what this Article calls the “revisability principle.” It is the
principle that an individual’s identity should always remain, to some significant extent,
revisable; that no person should be tied forever to her identity at a particular moment in
the distant past, and that to the extent individuals must forever account for who they were
long ago, their individual freedom to act and speak as they wish—both in the present and
in the future—is powerfully constrained.
The second purpose of this Article is to explain how emerging technologies place
unprecedented pressures on the revisability principle. Technologies and social practices
that result in the permanent storage, ready access, and widespread dissemination of past
mistakes or even prior identities that a person in the present hopes to leave behind
impinge on the principle of revisability by making it more difficult to disassociate oneself
from past choices that no longer reflect one’s self-conception. To the extent individuals
must forever account for decisions in the distant past—people they, in some sense, no
longer are—their freedom to speak, engage, and participate in democratic society and
cultural creation is powerfully constrained.

* Visiting Fellow, Yale Law School Information Society Project, and Law Clerk, Honorable
Cornelia T.L. Pillard, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Author wishes to
thank B.J. Ard, Jack Balkin, Jane Bambauer, Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Danielle Citron, Neil Richards,
Priscilla Smith, Esteve Sanz, Alexander Tsesis, and the participants in the 2014 Freedom of Expression
Scholars Conference at Yale Law School. This Article owes a great deal to the efforts of Emily Goldberg
Knox, Kristin MacDonnell, Nicole Teixeira, Ryan Stevens, Hayley Reynolds, Marco Janoski Gray, and
countless others on the Hastings Law Journal who worked tirelessly to improve its quality.
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Introduction
[M]ust everyone live in fear that every word [s]he speaks may be
transmitted or recorded and later repeated to the entire world? I can
imagine nothing that has a more chilling effect on people speaking their
minds and expressing their views on important matters. The advocates
of that regime should spend some time in totalitarian countries and
learn firsthand the kind of regime they are creating here.
—United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 764–65 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Authority is hardly required to support the proposition that words
would be measured a good deal more carefully and communication
inhibited if one suspected his conversations were being transmitted and
transcribed . . . . Much offhand exchange is easily forgotten and one
may count on the obscurity of his remarks, protected by the very fact of
a limited audience, and the likelihood that the listener will either
overlook or forget what is said, as well as the listener’s inability to
reformulate a conversation without having to contend with a
documented record.
—Id. at 787–88 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

Imagine a world in which every person carried a tiny microphone in
her pocket that was always switched on, constantly storing, recording,
and associating all the sounds and voices around it, putting voices to
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names, matching names to faces, and establishing the location and
identity of every person within earshot for easy access and retrieval.
Imagine a world in which every person wore glasses that recorded
everything they observed, identifying who they saw and where they saw
them in real time, matching faces to names, and names to identities,
permanently storing everything seen for later access and retrieval by
anyone. Imagine a world where every decision to share something with
one’s confidants, by virtue of the nature of the medium in which it was
shared, risked its wider dissemination, recordation, and permanent
identification with that individual.
That world is nipping at our heels. The technologies are already
1
here. The receiver on a cell phone can record at any time; as can the
webcam on a laptop or home computer. Google Glass promises a quiet,
passive visual and audio recording device on every face. Any kind of
sharing involving computers—from email, to social networks, to files in
the cloud—can always be forwarded or shared more widely, and once
shared, is shared forever.
Even if an individual were to take countermeasures, the traditional
means of avoiding that kind of exposure will prove unavailing in the
future. To the extent one can entirely avoid the use of modern
technology while attempting to live and work in a world dependent on it,
she surely faces unique challenges, risking isolation, even ostracization.
Even if an individual does choose to face those challenges, run that risk,
and forego the use of those technologies, she has no power to control
their use by others. Even if all but one person in the room has opted for
the more expensive cell phone plan that doesn’t leave the microphone
2
on, it only takes one to record everything that happens. The same will be
true of Google Glass—even if only one in one hundred were to wear it,
1. As Senator Ted Cruz often quips before delivering remarks: “Leave your cell phones on. I
want the President to hear this.” See Alina Kleinedam, Sen. Ted Cruz Denounces Obama Administration’s
Lawlessness, ABC News (May 7, 2014, 5:21 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/05/sen-tedcruz-denounces-obama-administrations-lawlessness; Emma Margolin, Ted Cruz Calls to ‘Repeal Every
Blessed Word of Obamacare,’ MSNBC (June 6, 2014, 4:58 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/ted-cruztexas-state-convention-obamacare.
2. If this sounds far-fetched or futuristic, one need only consider that Facebook is only a step
away from making this a reality. See Kashmir Hill, Facebook Wants to Listen in on What You’re Doing,
Forbes (May 22, 2014, 7:35 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/05/22/facebook-wantsto-listen-in-on-what-youre-doing (“Facebook is rolling out a new feature for its smartphone app that
can turn on users’ microphones and listen to what’s happening around them to identify songs playing
or television being watched.”); Ryan Tate, Why Facebook Spent a Year Learning to Listen in on Your
TV Shows, Wired (May 22, 2014, 1:23 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/05/facebooks-year-tv (“If
you’re watching TV or listening to music and you feel like discussing it online, Facebook believes,
nothing should stand in the way. Not even a few keystrokes.”); Ryan Tate, Facebook Will Soon Detect
What You’re Watching and Listening To, Wired (May 21, 2014, 6:49 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/
05/facebook-will-soon-detect-what-youre-watching-and-listening-to (“Facebook will soon automatically
identify the TV shows you’re watching and the music you’re listening to, making it easier to join online
discussions involving your latest bit of entertainment.”).
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an enormous amount of information about people’s lives that once would
never have been recorded, will be. It may even be indexed and made
searchable. It may already be.
That account of the world that is taking shape is not meant to paint
a dystopian portrait. It simply is the world that is coming. It is a world
where everything that happens will be known. But there is something
about this new world that feels frightening. The aim of this Article is to
explore the source of this response, and in so doing, shed light on an
intuition widely shared but seldom named. What is it about a world
where everything that happens can be researched, resurrected, recalled,
and recollected that strikes so many as troubling? This Article argues
that the source of this discomfort is rooted in our legal and political
culture’s shared commitment to the revisability principle—the principle
that an individual’s identity should always remain, to some significant
3
extent, revisable. Whether in insisting on secrecy in deliberations,
control over personal information, security in persons, houses, papers,
and effects, limits on what data can be collected, or how long it can be
stored, we have long recognized the importance of this principle in our
society, reflected in the widespread sense that certain things should
either remain unknown or fade from memory with the passage of time so
that an individual can speak freely now, or change her mind later.
This Article is about the impending conflict between the First
Amendment and new laws designed to safeguard revisability in the face
of emerging technologies. The revisability principle is deeply embedded
in American constitutional law and American culture, but for much of
American history it has been a self-enforcing constitutional value,
preserved organically by the limits of technology. Revisability has simply
been reality’s default rule, rarely requiring explicit protection in law,
because the technology to easily and cheaply record everything that
4
happened permanently and accessibly simply did not exist. As such,
society has not been required to make a deliberate collective commitment
to revisability by enacting prohibitions on recording, storing, or access
through positive law. Revisability was not a public value we were often
required to defend because it was a value that individuals could easily
protect on their own. The capacity to engage in significant revision, even
within relatively small communities, remained robust because much of
3. At the outset, it should be noted that there are innumerable situations in which it is widely
believed that individuals should account for the decisions that they have made—the people that they
were—even for the whole duration of their lives. Those who commit sex crimes are perhaps the most
powerful examples. Our society forever brands them sex offenders. But in these scenarios it is widely
recognized that the limitations society has chosen to place on an individual’s capacity to engage in
revision are a kind of scarlet letter, an enormous and burdensome restraint on individual freedom.
4. Anita L. Allen, Dredging up the Past: Lifelogging, Memory, and Surveillance, 75 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 47, 61 (2008) (“The limitations of memory combined with practical barriers to efficient dredging
once made it rational to predict that much of the past could be kept secret from people who matter.”).
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what happened was unrecordable, could be prevented from recordation,
was naturally limited in its potential dissemination, or would quickly fade
from memory.
For the last hundred years, the Supreme Court has crafted First
Amendment jurisprudence in a world in which laws meant to protect
revisability were often excessive. Legal protections for revisability offered
little marginal value at a time when most individuals could depend on the
fallibility of memory to protect their capacity to engage in self-reflection
and change. At the same time, laws with illicit motives, designed to stifle
speech, were often justified on the basis that they protected values like
revisability. That revisability was seen as a solid pretext for censorship
reveals just how important the principle has long been thought to be, but
it also had the effect of arousing an abiding suspicion of laws designed to
protect facts from disclosure in the name of preserving the autonomy of
individuals to engage in change. In a world in which laws meant to
safeguard revisability offered little marginal benefit and were often a
smokescreen for suppression, the Supreme Court responded in sweeping
language, explicitly elevating the right receive ideas and debate them
over countervailing interests proffered in the name of protecting
revisability. Those decisions are now the backbone of America’s First
Amendment canon, and are rightly celebrated. But at some point, the
different context in which they were decided faded from memory. Many
scholars and courts today read those cases broadly, understanding them
to imply that there simply is no revisability principle, or that it plays no
important role in the right to freedom of speech protected by the First
Amendment.
There is thus a significant risk that First Amendment rules and
doctrines designed for another time and technological world will hinder
modern legislative efforts to preserve revisability. The risk that laws
ostensibly concerned with revisability are actually thin veneers for
censorship remains as strong as it has ever been, but the clamor for laws
specifically designed to protect revisability grows greater by the day as
new technologies place significant unprecedented pressures on the
revisability principle. The combination of pervasive passive information
collection, information permanence, and easy access and retrieval,
threatens to significantly impinge on the capacity of individuals to revise
who they are and what they believe by making it possible to learn an
unprecedented amount of information about who they have been over
the course of their entire lives. That documentary record also increasingly
stands to be built from information gathered by others and collected and
organized by powerful private institutions, meaning that the capacity to
preserve revisability will no longer be within the power of individuals to
reasonably self-regulate. Because technological limitations will no longer
serve to safeguard an important constitutional principle, the law will need
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to take account of these changes in an effort, at the very least, to preserve
5
constitutional equilibrium. Legislatures will increasingly be called upon
in the laws that they pass to expressly articulate revisability’s importance,
and how those laws preserve it, if they are to survive First Amendment
scrutiny.
The debate is already happening in slightly different words and on
slightly different terms. Courts and political bodies in Europe are
increasingly coming to recognize an individual “right to erasure,” or, to
6
use the older and better known phrase, “right to be forgotten.” Those
courts and bodies are responding to the same dynamic technological
pressures as the United States, but unlike in the United States, their
efforts are seen as a natural outgrowth of a preexisting traditional
7
concern for individual “privacy.” The United States lacks a similar
dialectic between freedom of speech and privacy. It is therefore unclear
how much of that debate can or should inform the American debate over
the right to be forgotten. The relationship between privacy, which
necessarily involves things that individuals reasonably expect to keep
from public view, and a right to be forgotten—which necessarily involves
requiring that facts once exposed to public view be allowed to
disappear—is fuzzy. The concept of privacy is frequently nebulous, and
8
the human values it is meant to protect are seldom clear. Individual
expectations of privacy are embodied in a multitude of interests and
values, only some of which overlap with a right to be forgotten. European
courts and policy makers, and many scholars and advocates of privacy,
see the concept of privacy and the values it serves as reasonably welldefined, but American courts rarely have. Given their traditional
concern for illicitly motivated censorship, American courts are unlikely
to accept a concern for privacy as such as sufficient to sustain laws
limiting speech. For the right to be forgotten to take root in the United
States, if it is to take root, it will need to be planted in firmer soil.
Revisability is more precise than privacy, and the values that it
serves are easier to grasp. Revisability is the capacity of an individual to

5. See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 Harv. L.
Rev. 476, 480–81 (2011).
6. See Alexander Tsesis, The Right to Erasure: Privacy, Data Brokers, and the Indefinite
Retention of Data, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 433, 453, 462 (2014).
7. The leading case is a 2014 judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union finding a
right to be forgotten rooted in an individual right to privacy. Recent Case: Internet Law—Protection of
Personal Data—Court of Justice of the European Union Creates Presumption That Google Must
Remove Links to Personal Data Upon Request.—Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española
de Protección de Datos (May 13, 2014), 128 Harv. L. Rev. 735, 738 (explaining that “operator’s
economic interests” are “never sufficient to justify interference with privacy rights”).
8. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Right to Privacy, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 393, 393 (1978); George J.
Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 J. Legal Stud. 623, 640 (1980)
(claiming that “support for the privacy laws remains opaque”).
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change her beliefs and self-conception on the basis of her best
understanding of what they should be without regard to beliefs she once
held, in the distant past. Though the two concepts overlap, the belief that
individuals should have and be able to maintain a significant degree of
revisability is not the same as a belief that individuals should have and be
able to maintain a significant degree of privacy. Revisability is both
broader and narrower than privacy. It is broader in the sense that many
things that impinge on revisability—such as the threatened misuse or
misrepresentation of historic facts—do not implicate an individual’s
privacy; it is narrower in the sense that revisability is only one of many
possible justifications for privacy, and, in many instances, not even the
9
most central or compelling justification for it.
The argument that First Amendment doctrine will need to change
to preserve an overarching First Amendment value, however—whether
that value is respect for revisability, privacy, or something else—depends
on establishing that that value is worth preserving, that it forms an
important aspect of American law and culture, and that it is located
within America’s First Amendment tradition. The major aim of this Article
is to do all three—to place the revisability principle at its rightful place at
the very center of the American debate over the right to be forgotten.
As to its moral worth, revisability has significant value. That fact is
not necessarily immediately obvious. Depending on one’s intuitions, the
notion that individuals should in general be free from accountability for
many of their past decisions may strike some as morally repugnant rather
than morally worthwhile. As a threshold matter, any argument in favor
of the revisability principle must explain that allowing some things to
never be discovered, or to quickly be forgotten, leads to morally valuable
outcomes. The task is not to establish that revisability is always desirable,
because it is not, but rather to establish that in some circumstances it
could be important enough to be worth preserving. Perhaps the most
important value revisability serves is that it allows individuals to retain
the capacity to control, to some significant degree, their own destinies by
fashioning a conception of themselves through successive deliberate
choices that they make. In this way, a commitment to revisability reflects
10
a commitment to preserving autonomy. One important consequence of
this connection is that the same powerful arguments that can be
marshalled in favor of preserving a significant degree of individual
autonomy also support revisability.

9. For views critical of privacy without some more compelling justification than a desire to
consciously conceal facts an individual would prefer not be disclosed, see, for example, Posner, supra
note 8, and Stigler, supra note 8 (claiming that “support for the privacy laws remains opaque”).
10. By autonomy I mean positive autonomy, reflecting not merely a lack of restraints on
individual action but also the freedom to select among valuable alternatives free from manipulation
and coercion, and in doing so, create a conception of oneself and one’s aims by oneself.
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As to its place in American culture, one need look no further than
literature to see that the belief that people should have freedom to revise
is deeply felt. From The Scarlet Letter—where Hester Prynne struggles to
create a new life of repentance and dignity after conceiving a daughter
through an adulterous affair—to Les Misérables—where the broken Jean
Valjean, convicted of stealing a loaf of bread, transforms himself into a
man of virtue and a devoted substitute father to a girl who loses her
mother—American art has long reflected our national devotion to the
11
promise of redemption.
As to its place in American law and the First Amendment, as this
12
Article will show, the revisability principle occupies an important station.
The opportunity to revise one’s beliefs and identity is at the very core of
the reason we protect the freedom of expression. The prominent apparent
counterexamples at the heart of First Amendment jurisprudence are not,
as some scholars seem to suggest, a rejection of the notion that laws
passed in the name of preserving revisability have no important role to
play in American society. Rather, those decisions represent a balancing
of values appropriate to their time and technological context, between
the important need to preserve a space for public debate that is robust,
uninhibited, and wide open, and the need to preserve a space for individuals
to reflect on their conceptions of themselves, and revise what they believe.
That the First Amendment, and American law more generally, strongly
embodies both values, is more easily seen in a spectrum of other doctrines
that have grown up to protect revisability in a variety of areas, from
property to privacy.
The final aim of this Article is to suggest the kinds of changes that
will need to occur in judicial doctrines concerning privacy and freedom of
expression to take account of the increasing strains that new technologies
and practices place on the revisability principle. This Article’s ultimate
aim is to explain the centrality of the right to revise to the liberty and
freedom protected by the Constitution. For the judge confronting a legal
regulation meant to safeguard revisability, a critical aspect of any proper
First Amendment analysis must be consideration of the degree to which
the regulation achieves these aims.

11. Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter (Luciana Piréa ed., Giunti Press 2010) (1850);
Victor Hugo, Les Misérables (Isabel F. Hapgood trans., Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1877) (1862). On
the other hand, authors from Herman Mellville to Mark Twain have also presented the converse of
America’s great faith in the capacity of individuals to leave behind their pasts. Melville’s The
Confidence-Man and Twain’s story of The Duke and The King (who travel from town to riverside
town defrauding as they go) in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, are both efforts to come to grips
with the unique problems that arise when one can shed her identity too freely.
12. Jack Balkin has argued U.S. constitutional history itself is crucially founded on a forwardlooking redemptive commitment. See Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith
in an Unjust World 25–26 (2011).
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The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I introduces the general
notion of the revisability principle, and explains why it is morally valuable.
Part II provides a range of examples of the revisability principle in
American law. Part III defends the legitimacy of the revisability principle
in the face of key First Amendment decisions that have been thought by
many to hold that there simply is not one, or that it is not important to
First Amendment analysis. Part IV explains how new technologies place
significant pressures on the revisability principle as a self-executing
constitutional principle. Part V builds on these insights in discussing how
the revisability principle might be protected in a world where it will be
possible for third parties to record, store, organize, and retrieve
everything that happens all of the time.

I. The Revisability Principle
The revisability principle is the notion that individuals should
remain free to engage in significant revision of their identities throughout
their lives, a principle instantiated in large measure by the fact that, for
much of human history, much of what individuals did remained unknown
13
or went unrecorded. Though revisability has long been something
individuals outside of totalitarian regimes have enjoyed, it is not necessarily
clear why that was so. The cost of recording and storing information
about individuals was much higher in the past, and efforts to do so with
older technologies were often considered unacceptably intrusive. There
is a risk that treating the revisability principle as something our society
values because we had a lot of it in the past confuses what was with what
ought to be. If, going forward, affirmative collective measures are going
to be taken to preserve revisability, its value will have to be explicitly
defended, rather than implicitly derived. That task is not as easy as it
might appear to some. The burden of establishing that revisability is morally
valuable, as opposed to morally objectionable, is a heavy one. Across a
14
wide range of human endeavors, we demand accountability.
13. Everything from daily, routine activities to more important things, like work and life
milestones, were not shared widely, and even when shared widely, were not shared for long. Tracking
down an old wedding or birth announcement took effort in the past; today it takes nothing more than
a two-second internet search.
14. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, The Failure of American Privacy Law, in Protecting Privacy
139, 140 (Basil S. Markesinis ed., 1999) (“[P]rivacy is not the only cherished American value. We also
cherish information, and candour, and freedom of speech. We expect to be free to discover and discuss
the secrets of our neighbours, celebrities, and public officials. We expect government to conduct its
business publicly, even if that infringes the privacy of those caught up in the matter. Most of all, we
expect the media to uncover the truth and report it—not merely the truth about government and
public affairs, but the truth about people. The law protects these expectations too—and when they
collide with expectations of privacy, privacy almost always loses.”); H. J. McCloskey, The Political
Ideal of Privacy, 21 Phil Q. 303, 308–09 (1971) (arguing that many relationships create obligations of
accountability); Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus the First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach,
11 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 97, 152 (2000) (“Throughout history, people have generally
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The revisability principle places two freedoms into direct conflict—
the right of individuals to change who they are by having things about
them remain unknown or unknowable, be forgotten, or be limited in
dissemination, and the right of other individuals to hold them accountable
for who they once were, by knowing about or remembering what they
have done. As Professor Jane Bambauer has explained, efforts “to preserve
the information status quo . . . clash with the First Amendment” by
“deliberately interfer[ing] with an individual’s effort to learn something
15
new.” As Professor Eugene Volokh has described, “our right to use
speech to pressure others into not speaking is a fundamental aspect of
the First Amendment; recall that a recurring (and correct) argument of
those who fight against advocacy of evil ideas . . . is that such speech
16
should be deterred by social ostracism and condemnation.” Efforts to
limit how much can be known about an individual’s prior beliefs or past
associations risks weakening the capacity of individuals to learn new and
useful things (perhaps by discovering what shared or formative experiences
others have had), or hold them accountable for their actions, or question
their motives in taking actions in the present on the basis of their
questionable beliefs and decisions in the past. Those are powerful rejoinders
to any argument in favor of protecting revisability. The task of this Part is
to confront those arguments, and carry out the difficult task of setting
forth the threshold case for the moral value of revisability.
Allowing individuals to engage in revision leads to a variety of morally
valuable outcomes. First, it encourages individuals to share authentic
versions of themselves. Second, it encourages intellectual innovation and
experimentation. Third, it encourages individuals to engage sincerely with
one another, and in that way promotes uninhibited, robust, and wide-open
private speech. Fourth, it significantly reduces the price of persuasion.
Fifth, it radically expands the realm of perceived and actual available
choices an individual has. Sixth, it is essential to allowing individuals to
retain autonomy. Seventh, in the aggregate, it has a significant positive
impact on deliberative democracy.

been free to learn about one another in the course of business transactions and other day-to-day
contacts. Restrictions that alter this default rule sweep a potentially enormous pool of facts and ideas
out of the shared domain.”).
15. Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 57, 60 (2014).
16. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a
Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1049, 1109 (2000).
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A. Revisability’s Morally Valuable Consequences

First, a commitment to revisability encourages individuals to share
authentic versions of themselves with others because they need not fear
that they will be held accountable for their authentic opinions, ideas,
18
tastes, or preferences in the future. Many people consider authenticity
morally valuable. From the perspective of the individual who is free to
behave authentically, that individual is freer than an individual who must
carefully guard who it is they really are. From the perspective of the
individual who interacts with authentic individuals, it can be argued that
that she can form deeper and more meaningful connections with them,
and rely more freely on their representations about what they actually
think and believe. Authenticity, flowing from revisability, thus promotes
a variety of goods traditionally linked to the First Amendment—helping
individuals to find those of like and different minds to join with or
19
persuade, and facilitating authentic relationships.
Second, a commitment to revisability encourages innumerable forms
20
of expressively valuable innovation and experimentation. Most individuals
live their lives simply as best they can, with only provisional beliefs about
what should be done. They are uncertain and conflicted, but given all
that they know, they make decisions, judgments or recommendations that,
to the best of their knowledge, are good ones. Most individual lives consist
of a constellation of these deliberate but imperfect acts. Experiments.
Risks. Choices for which individuals could be, but would rather not be,
17. It must be remembered, however, that each of these morally valuable consequences might be
met with a counter-consequence—one that is also morally valuable. Limitations on revisability might
lead to decisions that are even more authentic because they must be made accountably. See Seth F.
Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional
Law, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 102 (1991) (“It is only by publicly avowing a position that we are able to make
it our own.”). However, the task of this Part is to make a prima facie or affirmative case for revisability as
morally valuable, and so counterarguments will not be addressed as fulsomely as perhaps they could be.
18. Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1904, 1906–07 (2013) (“All seem to
agree, however, that the self possesses ‘an autonomous core—an essential self identifiable after the
residue of influence has been subtracted.’” (quoting Julie E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked
Self: Law, Code, and the Play of Everyday Practice 113 (2012))).
19. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 763 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“‘To be
alone and be let alone, to be with chosen company, to say what you think, or don’t think, but to say
what you will, is to be yourself. . . . Few conversations would be what they are if the speakers thought
others were listening. Silly, secret, thoughtless and thoughtful statements would all be affected. The
sheer numbers in our lives, the anonymity of urban living and the inability to influence things that are
important are depersonalizing and dehumanizing factors of modern life. To penetrate the last refuge
of the individual, the precious little privacy that remains, the basis of individual dignity, can have
meaning to the quality of our lives that we cannot foresee. In terms of present values, that meaning
cannot be good.’” (quoting R. Clark, Crime in America 287 (1970))).
20. Cf. Cohen, supra note 18, at 1918 (“Conditions of diminished privacy also impair the capacity
to innovate.”); George Plimpton, The Art of Fiction No. 21: Ernest Hemingway, Paris Rev., Spring
1958, available at http://www.theparisreview.org/interviews/4825/the-art-of-fiction-no-21-ernest-hemingway
(“The fun of talk is to explore, but much of it and all that is irresponsible should not be written. Once
written you have to stand by it. You may have said it to see whether you believed it or not.”).
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held to account. Much of this private expressive action is safeguarded by
a commitment to revisability. These experiments may be merely small or
petite freedoms: the expression of a present sense impression, an excited
utterance, the telling of a joke, attendance at a party, swimming in a
reservoir, asking someone to dance, but in the aggregate they constitute
a sphere of risky action of significant value. Expressively valuable
experiments may also be far more substantial than these, bearing
significant physical or emotional risk, for example, or relating more plainly
to scientific innovation. In any event, however, a commitment to revisability
enhances the volume of this sphere. The cost of undertaking a significant
assessment of the risks and benefits related to making an imperfect
decision, recommendation, or judgment are significantly diminished where
it is known or sincerely believed that it will not remembered.
Third, a commitment to revisability encourages uninhibited, robust,
21
and wide-open private dialogue. The revisability principle, in its concern
with the capacity to shield some conversations or interactions from being
long remembered or forever tied to an individual’s identity, lays bare the
distinction between free speech and speaking freely. A commitment to
22
revisability allows individuals to speak freely. In everyday life this
commitment manifests in myriad situations: those in which individuals
attempt to engage with others anonymously or without disclosing their
identities, speak under special House Rules or deliberate behind closed
23
doors, confer over the telephone or discuss in hushed voices or whispers,
or send messages to the world through signposts, billboards, bulletin boards,
or bumper stickers. Beyond its capacity to encourage authenticity, a
21. Cf. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 537 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The statutory
restrictions before us directly enhance private speech . . . . The statutes ensure the privacy of telephone
conversations much as a trespass statute ensures privacy within the home. That assurance of privacy
helps to overcome our natural reluctance to discuss private matters when we fear that our private
conversations may become public. And the statutory restrictions consequently encourage conversations
that otherwise might not take place.”).
22. Cf. White, 401 U.S. at 762–63 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Monitoring, if prevalent, certainly
kills free discourse and spontaneous utterances. Free discourse—a First Amendment value—may be
frivolous or serious, humble or defiant, reactionary or revolutionary, profane or in good taste; but it is
not free if there is surveillance. Free discourse liberates the spirit, though it may produce only froth.
The individual must keep some facts concerning [her] thoughts within a small zone of people. At the
same time [s]he must be free to pour out [her] woes or inspirations or dreams to others. [She] remains
the sole judge as to what must be said and what must remain unspoken.”).
23. Cf. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 545 (1965) (“[T]elevised jurors cannot help but feel the
pressures of knowing that friends and neighbors have their eyes upon them. If the community be
hostile to an accused a televised juror . . . may well be led ‘not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true
between the State and the accused.’”); id. at 566–68 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (“The even more
serious danger is that neither the judge, prosecutor, defense counsel, jurors or witnesses would be able
to go through trial without considering the effect of their conduct on the viewing public. . . . No one
could forget that [s]he was constantly in the focus of the ‘all-seeing eye.’”); id. at 595 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (“A trial in Yankee Stadium . . . would be a substantially different affair from a trial in a
traditional courtroom . . . the witnesses, lawyers, judges, and jurors in the stadium would [not] be more
truthful, diligent, and capable of reliably finding facts and determining guilt or innocence.”).
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commitment to revisability promotes candor and exchange. This value is
independent of the value of authenticity: it is the distinct and equally
important value of honesty. In many ways the two overlap, but in many
ways they do not. Being true to thyself does not always mean that one
feels able to tell others what is true. A commitment to revisability
promotes both authenticity and an arguably even more important First
Amendment value: sincerity.
Fourth, a commitment to revisability significantly reduces the price
of persuasion—the cost of joining or contributing to a cause or
persuading another person to join or contribute to a cause. In many ways
the values at the heart of the First Amendment depend on the notion
that minds can be changed because of an idea’s merit, irrespective of
extraneous considerations (such as threatened consequences of adopting
24
that idea). The two most prominent judicial theories of speech—that
25
ideas trade on a “market” (Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes) and that the
remedy for speech that tends to lead us into error is “more speech”
26
(Justice Louis Brandeis) —presuppose that individuals remain free to
27
adopt or reject ideas on the merits of those ideas themselves. To the
extent individuals are pressured to remain committed to ideas they once
had because it is remembered or can easily be discovered that they once
held them, this freedom to weigh and adopt ideas on their merits is
diminished. When the price of persuasion rises too high, both of the most
prominent justifications for robust protection of the freedom of speech
come under significant threat.
Fifth, a commitment to revisability radically expands the range of
actual and apparent choices an individual might have about who she will
be and what she will believe. This has significant eudemonic consequences.
Individuals have been shown to place significant value on even the
28
appearance that they have choices. “Research has shown that autonomy,
agency and the freedom of choice enhance Americans’ intrinsic motivation
and mental health, generate greater persistence, increase performance,
29
and lead to higher satisfaction.” The feeling one is choosing or exercising

24. Cf. Ronald Beiner, Political Judgment 56–58 (1983) (explaining that “[t]he autonomy of
judgment requires that it exclude accommodation to the judgment of the public”).
25. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
26. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
27. Cf. David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 Colum. L. Rev.
334, 334 (1991) (“The government may not suppress speech on the ground that it is too persuasive.”).
28. Barry Schwartz, Choice, Freedom, and Autonomy, in Meaning, Mortality, and Choice: The
Social Psychology of Existential Concerns 271, 272, 281 (Phillip R. Shaver & Mario Mikulincer
eds., 2012) (“[T]here is no denying that ‘choice is good.’”).
29. Sheena S. Iyengar and Mark R. Lepper, When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too
Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 995, 995 (2000) (“[D]ecades of psychological
theory and research . . . [have] repeatedly demonstrated, across many domains, a link between the
provision of choice and increases in intrinsic motivation, perceived control, task performance, and life
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choice, moreover, has expressive value all its own: every choice a person
makes is an opportunity to affirm a set of commitments and to tell the
world what she cares about. Thus, to the extent we think that choices are
good—even boring, uninteresting choices like which brand of jam we like
to purchase—a commitment to revisability militates in favor of allowing
them to go unrecorded or be forgotten.
The foregoing arguments are not meant to establish that revisability
is a universal solvent, good in every situation. There are innumerable
reasons to care about what individuals have done in the past as well. Past
decisions are clues to present intentions. We are all constantly interested
in knowing more about the people with whom we interact—so we can
know whether to trust them, or whether we agree with them across a
range of beliefs that they might otherwise wish to hide. Individuals
themselves also sometimes want a record, so they can prove their consistent
good character, or just prove that something did in fact happen in the
past. But until recently, and to a remarkable degree, our society accepted
and thought it valuable that we could only know relatively little about
the pasts of those with whom we associated. The purpose of this Subpart
is to show that that was not a mistake. Just as there are strong reasons to
want to know whether the person you are talking to once held beliefs
with which you disagree, there are also strong reasons not to want to
know. Allowing people to hide everything about themselves would make
human interaction impossible, but preventing people from hiding anything
about themselves would have the same effect.
30

B. Revisability’s Link to Significant Autonomy

Among the most important values the revisability principle preserves
is the capacity to exercise “significant autonomy,” by which is meant not
only the freedom to make choices, but also choices of a particularly
profound and personal kind. “(Significantly) autonomous persons are

satisfaction.”); Tamar Kricheli-Katz, Choice, Discrimination, and the Motherhood Penalty, 46 Law &
Soc’y Rev. 557, 558 (2012).
30. Professor Julie E. Cohen has argued that it is a mistake to link privacy (one means by which
revisability is safeguarded) to liberal political theory because “conceptualiz[ing] privacy as a form of
protection for the liberal self” contributes to the perception that “privacy is antiquated and socially
retrograde.” See Cohen, supra note 18, at 1905. The idea seems to be that since no one in fact possesses
significant autonomy, but is rather shaped only by what happens to them, privacy’s goal, “‘simply put, is
to ensure that the development of subjectivity and the development of communal values do not proceed
in lockstep.’” Id. at 1911 (quoting Julie E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and
the Play of Everyday Practice 150 (2012)). Even if this is so—and I hesitate to assign any single point or
purpose to privacy—it is difficult to understand why privacy’s unpopularity has to do with its rootedness
in a belief that individuals can exercise significant autonomy or not, and even if in reality they cannot, why
that makes a difference. See Jeremy Waldron, Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of
Freedom, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1097, 1113–14 (1989) [hereinafter Waldron, Autonomy and Perfectionism]
(criticizing the emptiness of this critique of autonomy); Jeremy Waldron, Particular Values and Critical
Morality, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 561, 563–65 (1989) (same).
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those who can shape their life and determine its course.” An individual
who possesses significant personal autonomy not only retains the freedom
to make choices but also the ability to exercise that freedom to “adopt
personal projects, develop relationships, and accept commitments to causes,
through which their personal integrity and sense of dignity and self-respect
32
are made concrete.”
Every society understands a notion of significant autonomy. As
anthropologist Donald E. Brown explained in his seminal work Human
Universals, every culture sees individuals as more than “wholly passive
recipient[s] of external action . . . . They know that people have a private
inner life, have memories, make plans, choose between alternatives, and
33
otherwise make decisions (not without ambivalent feeling sometimes).”
And indeed, in our own experience, every person can recall some point
in her life where she fundamentally reassessed her beliefs. Whether this
reflection resulted in an emphatic reaffirmation of her past choices, or
instead resulted in an a conscious and deliberate decision to take on new
beliefs and new causes, to sever connections with past associations, or to
form new relationships and become, in some sense, a new person, it is
widely recognized that this sort of freedom is worthwhile and worth
34
preserving.
A commitment to revisability is, in many senses, profoundly
intertwined with the capacity to live with significant autonomy. Significant
autonomy requires that individuals possess not merely choice in the sense of
the opportunity to rationally weigh outcomes, but that individuals possess
35
choices that are meaningful. These choices must reflect a “choice of
36
goods.” Prisoners have many choices, but no one would think they
possess significant autonomy. Nor do individuals whose choices are limited
37
to black and white choices between good and evil. Rather,
[a] person is autonomous only if [s]he had a variety of acceptable
options available to [her] to choose from, and [her] life became as it is
through [her] choice of some of these options. A person who has never
had any significant choice, or was not aware of it, or never exercised
choice in significant matters but simply drifted through life is not an
38
autonomous person.

31. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 154 (1986).
32. Id.
33. Donald E. Brown, Human Universals 135 (1991).
34. Waldron, Autonomy and Perfectionism, supra note 30, at 1122 (implicitly endorsing the view
that one could “say simply that autonomy is unequivocally good and that the growth of the social
circumstances that make it both possible and important is to be celebrated unconditionally as one of
the advances of modern life”).
35. Raz, supra note 31, at 300.
36. Id. at 379.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 204. While I am using Professor Joseph Raz’s explanation of autonomy, both Professor
Robert Nozick and Professor John Rawls endorsed similar conceptions. See Robert Nozick, Anarchy,
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To deprive an individual of the capacity to engage in revision is to
impinge significantly on her capacity to decide whether a goal, plan, project,
relationship, or commitment that she once pursued should be abandoned
or reaffirmed.
The most frequent manner in which an individual is deprived of
significant autonomy is through manipulation and coercion, two conscious
means of “distort[ing] normal processes of decision and the formation of
39
preferences.” Coercion and manipulation, however, require conscious
action, and while vulnerability to these harms are both increased when
everything is known and remembered, the revisability principle concerns
itself with more than these harms alone. After all, revisability is impinged
where the choices that individuals have about who they can be in the
present are restricted because of who they have been in the past, even if
those choices are not being consciously used against them by anyone at
any particular moment. As such, one might contend that not everything
that impinges on revisability impinges on significant autonomy.
But restraints on who an individual can be today because of who she
has been in the past are inconsistent with having significant autonomy
over one’s self, because “[t]o be autonomous, one must identify with
40
one’s choices, and one must be loyal to them.” Fear of coercion and
manipulation can be just as powerful as actual coercion and manipulation,
and this is the key link between revisability and significant autonomy.
Where an individual cannot engage in revision, she becomes increasingly
alienated from and disloyal to her own life plans, goals, and projects,
even as she continues to pursue them. This is a weighty restraint on
freedom. “A person who feels driven by forces which [s]he disowns but
cannot control, who hates or detests the desires which motivate [her] or
41
the aims that [she] is pursuing, does not lead an autonomous life.”
Preserving a broad place for revisability, therefore, provides space for
the exercise of significant personal autonomy by preserving the possibility
of a life lived according to one’s best understanding of how it should be
42
lived, given all the facts that an individual has in the present. For “the
State and Utopia 49–50 (1974); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971) (“[A] person may be regarded
as a human life lived according to a plan . . . [and that] an individual says who [s]he is by describing [her]
purposes and causes, what [s]he intends to do in [her] life.”); id. at 92–93 (“We are to suppose, then, that
each individual has a rational plan of life drawn up subject to the conditions that confront [her]. This plan
is designed to permit the harmonious satisfaction of [her] interests. It schedules activities so that various
desires can be fulfilled without interference. It is arrived at by rejecting other plans that are either less
likely to succeed or do not provide for such an inclusive attainment of aims.”).
39. Raz, supra note 31, at 378.
40. Id. at 382.
41. Id.
42. This is, in some sense, the dream of “empiricism without the Dogmas” explained by
philosopher W.V.O. Quine, who argued that all notions must always remain, in principle, revisable,
because “[t]he totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of
geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even pure mathematics and logic,
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ideal of personal autonomy is not to be identified with the ideal of giving
one’s life a unity”; the “autonomous life may consist of diverse and
heterogeneous pursuits. And a person who frequently changes [her] tastes
can be as autonomous as one who never shakes off [her] adolescent
43
preferences.” The key is that a life lived with significant autonomy is a
44
life of “choices”; a “life freely chosen.”
But to the extent that social practices and technologies significantly
curtail an individual’s ability to engage in reflection and revision, because
she must give an account of decisions she has made in the distant past that
have been recorded permanently and accessibly, this capacity to form and
pursue plans in the present might be meaningfully diminished. The capacity
for autonomy is therefore, to some potentially significant extent, lost.
Counterarguments against revisability are similar in kind to
conventional counterarguments against autonomy. Restraints on individual
autonomy are a critical component of a functioning society, in spheres from
education, to work, to family life, to law enforcement. Those restraints are
undeniably good and necessary. But across that vast spectrum, what
remains remarkable is the degree to which American law and social
institutions have carved a space for individual autonomy, recognizing its
45
worth, even at potentially significant cost.
C. Revisability’s Link to Democracy
Without belaboring the point, it is worth noting that democracy
itself depends in no small measure on the revisability principle, on the
idea that people’s minds can be changed, that they can be convinced to
join and embrace a cause with which they once disagreed. Whole societies
have been paralyzed by an unwillingness or inability to move beyond events
in the distant past. In Northern Ireland’s pubs, “discussions of the 1690
Battle of Boyne can still be heard ‘like it was last week’s hurling match,’ with
flags representing each side continuing to decorate and demarcate the
46
different neighborhoods.” “Abkhaz and Georgians both view Abkhazia
as their homeland, just as Serbs and Albanians see parts of Kosovo as

is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges.” Willard Van Orman Quine, Two
Dogmas of Empiricism, in From a Logical Point of View 20, 39 (3d rev. ed. 1980).
43. Raz, supra note 31, at 370–71.
44. Id. at 371.
45. For examples of some decisions to preserve autonomy embedded in the American legal tradition,
even at significant cost, see infra Part II.
46. Dominic D.P. Johnson & Monica Duffy Toft, Grounds for War: The Evolution of Territorial
Conflict, 38 Int’l Security 7, 7 (2014) (quoting Dennis Pringle, Separation and Integration: The Case
of Ireland, in Shared Space, Divided Space: Essays on Conflict and Territorial Organization, xxv
(Michael Chisholm & David M. Smith, eds., 1990)).
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47

theirs.” These and other stories of persistent intergenerational ethnic and
territorial conflict are stories of revision’s failure.
Nearly every statement about the value of speech as a means of
trading in ideas quietly assumes the premise that these ideas trade in a
society strongly devoted to the revisability principle. As has already been
noted, both Justice Holmes’ “marketplace” theory and Justice Brandeis’
“more speech” theory, are founded, at root, on the premise that men can
realize that “time has upset many fighting faiths” and so “believe even more
than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct” that their faith
48
too, could be mistaken. As one critic accurately described philosopher
John Stuart Mill’s theory of the power of unfettered trade in ideas, that
marketplace’s power depends on our willingness to believe that “repeated
effort to defend one’s convictions serves to keep their justification alive
in our minds and guards against the twin dangers of falsehood and
49
fanaticism.” But an individual can only revise what she believes if she is
free to do so. As such, it is essential to democracy that individuals remain
free to revise their ideas.
It could be argued that recordation should have little impact on
whether people feel free to change their views, because even if everything
is recorded in the future, individuals will adapt to that circumstance, and
simply feel more free to more frequently change their beliefs and positions
despite there being recorded evidence of their earlier beliefs. As such, a
society in which more is known about what anyone and everyone has
done and has previously believed should not greatly concern us. But that
argument suffers from several flaws. First, it blinks reality to suggest that
individuals will not suffer if they are forced to forever account for their
past beliefs and associations, no matter how provisional or misguided. If
what an individual previously believed had no bearing on how people
viewed them in the present, people would already happily disclose all of
their past mistakes rather than downplay them. Instead, individuals who
have changed their minds are regularly punished and coerced when beliefs,
50
ideas, and associations they once had come to light. Because it is not the
case that individuals freely disclose the mistaken beliefs they have held, it is
apparent that people value being allowed to consider issues anew, without
being forced to answer for changing their perspectives. Additionally, the
argument that society will “adapt” and magically become more tolerant
47. Id. (citing Monica Duffy Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests,
and the Indivisibility of Territory (2003)).
48. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
49. Robert Paul Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism 11 (1968).
50. For example, recently, the former CEO of Mozilla, Brendan Eich was fired from Mozilla for
having once held the view that same-sex couples should not have the right to marry, though by the time
of his ouster his views had changed. Stephen Shankland, Mozilla Under Fire: Inside the 9-Day Reign of
Fallen CEO Brendan Eich, CNET (June 13, 2014, 4:14 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/mozilla-underfire-inside-the-9-day-reign-of-fallen-ceo-brendan-eich/.
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of individuals’ changing their beliefs has an accordion-like quality—it can
be stretched or narrowed to fit any argument that new technologies or
social practices should not concern us. The tolerance argument is both
unproven and unlikely, especially in light of the fact that there will
always remain some people, who, due to superior wealth or careful
planning, will manage to avoid taking a recorded view on any subject. A
society that encourages individuals not to commit to a view out of a fear
of consequences is as bad as a society that pressures them to commit to a
view and then never change it. Because permanent recordation takes the
decision to disclose away from the speaker, and places the power to
judge whether a past belief or association should be held against someone
in the hands of others, it is difficult to believe that individuals will remain
as free to update and revise their beliefs in a future of pervasive, permanent,
and easily accessible recordation as they are now.

II. Examples of the Revisability Principle in Law
Below the surface of American law are many tacit but nonetheless
crucial and identifiable values and commitments. One might think of these
values and commitments as America’s “deep constitution,” the nine-tenths
that float just beneath the surface. For example, the Constitution’s
commitment to “aesthetic neutrality” could be thought of as among these
commitments—rarely explicitly stated, it is the widely shared belief that
each person should remain, to some significant degree, free to develop
51
and express her own idea of beauty.
The revisability principle has long played a similarly quiet but
foundational role across a range of legal doctrines, especially those
governing privacy—of the reasonable expectations, propertarian, and
personhood kinds—but also doctrines as diverse as those governing
individual liberty and freedom of expression, evidence, property,
criminal law, civil and criminal procedure, and contracts. Like many deep
constitutional principles, it does not frequently appear as the holding of
the case, but instead surfaces briefly, as the justification for the holding,
or the insistent theme, ornament, or leitmotif lurking behind it. The goal
of this Part is to highlight the revisability principle’s many forms and
guises in American law.
A. Revisability as a General Legal Principle
A commitment to revisability—to the fundamental notion that the
best decision now should trump whatever seemed to be the best decision
then—permeates American law. Everywhere one looks there is a general

51. Andrew Tutt, Blightened Scrutiny, 47 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1807 (2014).
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tendency to disfavor inalterable commitments, and instead to favor
revisability. Consider the following examples:
The writ of habeas corpus is always theoretically available, no
matter how much time has passed or how many prior petitions have been
52
brought. The Constitution requires that every prisoner have “a
meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that [s]he is being held pursuant
53
to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant law,” in
theory no matter who or where she is.
Contracts may not prohibit future amendments, no matter what the
parties might attempt to agree to, and even if the parties want to tie their
hands today. The reason courts have given is that “parties would not change
their minds regarding the deal’s substance [at a later date] without good
reasons, so parties can have no good reason to prevent themselves from
54
changing their minds regarding the deal’s substance [at the outset].”
The very notion of bankruptcy “reveals our acceptance of the fact
that beyond a certain point, the sheer magnitude of a person’s debt may
be demoralizing”—unbearably so—and thus, “[o]ne reason for giving the
debtor a fresh start is to counteract the self-hatred [s]he may feel, having
mortgaged [her] entire future in a series of past decisions [s]he now
55
regrets.”
The right of individuals to pursue their chosen professions and
occupations is deeply rooted in the common law, which is why noncompete
agreements are so often held to be unenforceable or narrowly construed.
“Even in states that allow such clauses, they are ‘looked upon with disfavor,
56
cautiously considered, and carefully scrutinized’ by courts,” for “courts are
aware these restrictions place a heavy burden upon the ability of agents to
57
pursue their careers and practice their skills.”
In property, restraints on alienability are highly disfavored: “[o]ften,
statutes prohibit and courts invalidate outright restraints on alienability;
when faced with more moderate restraints, courts may impose time limits

52. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996—Actual Innocence Gateway—
Mcquiggin v. Perkins, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 318, 318 (2013) (“Last Term, in McQuiggin v. Perkins, the
Supreme Court created an exception to a statutory barrier—a statute of limitations—for the actually
innocent. Though the purpose of habeas relief is to correct constitutionally significant procedural
defects, the Court properly allowed concerns for substantive justice to guide its decision.”).
53. Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After Boumediene v. Bush,
110 Colum. L. Rev. 537, 542–43 (2010) (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008)).
54. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale
L.J. 541, 611 (2003).
55. Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 Yale L.J. 763, 785 (1983).
56. David Lincicum, Inevitable Conflict?: California’s Policy of Worker Mobility and the Doctrine of
“Inevitable Disclosure,” 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1257, 1269 (2002) (quoting Bennett v. Storz Broad. Co., 134
N.W.2d 892, 898 (Minn. 1965).
57. Phillip J. Closius Henry, Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current Judicial Enforcement of
Employee Covenants Not to Compete—A Proposal for Reform, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 531, 540 (1984).
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58

or otherwise protect an individual’s right to exit.” This limitation on the
capacity of individuals to tie up property forever is most famously captured
by the rule against perpetuities, “one of the oldest and most important
59
social policies embraced by Anglo-American law.”
The right of individuals to fundamentally change the character of
the use of her property has long been a cherished right, giving rise to a
variety of other rights against regulations that would circumscribe the
60
capacity of an individual to demolish, alter, repair, or revise her property.
As Professor Margaret Jane Radin explained, one reason why certain
regulatory takings involving merely pecuniary losses do not require
compensation, but physical occupations no matter how minor do, is that
“exclusion may correspond to the picture, at the core of liberal ideology, of
the individual’s right to use property to express her individual liberty,
61
which means using property to fend off intruders into her space.”
On the other hand, once one dies, it is an equally cherished American
tradition for those still living to challenge the reasonableness of the
decedent’s wishes regarding the disposition of the estate: “When the control
exerted by a testator reaches too far and seeks to influence or proscribe
choices in a beneficiary’s life as personal and intimate as whom [s]he
should marry, principles of ‘public policy’ often come to the rescue and
62
invalidate many such dispositions.”
In criminal law, the model penal code provides that a coconspirator can
come into the light, give up on the conspiracy, and absolve herself of guilt:
“[R]epudiation of criminal purpose is said to indicate lack of firm antisocial
intent, and hence the absence of any real public danger . . . [moreover]
‘the law should provide a means for encouraging persons to abandon
63
courses of criminal activity which they have already undertaken.’” In

58. Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 Yale L.J. 549, 569 (2001).
59. Stephen A. Siegel, John Chipman Gray, Legal Formalism, and the Transformation of Perpetuities
Law, 36 U. Miami L. Rev. 439, 440 n.8 (1982); see also id. at 440–46 (describing the sixteenth century
movement toward “the use of future interests to control the devolution of wealth, usually in an
attempt to keep it within the family indefinitely”).
60. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 Yale L.J. 781, 794 (2005) (“The
right to destroy is also an extreme version of the right to use; by destroying a piece of jewelry, I do not
merely use it—I use it up.”).
61. Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence
of Takings, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1667, 1678 (1988); see Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J.
733, 774 (1964) (arguing property provides “a small but sovereign island of [one’s] own”).
62. Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Public Policy and Antisocial Testators, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1315, 1317
(2011). As John Stuart Mill explained, while “bequest is one of the attributes of property,” it “might
be limited or varied, according to views of expediency.” John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political
Economy 226–27 (W.J. Ashley ed., Longmans, Green, & Co. 1909) (1848). As Thomas Jefferson wrote
to James Madison, “the earth belongs in usufruct to the living. . . . [T]he dead have neither powers nor
rights over it.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 6 The Works of Thomas
Jefferson 3, 3–4 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., G. P. Putnam’s Sons 1904).
63. Peter Buscemi, Conspiracy: Statutory Reform Since the Model Penal Code, 75 Colum. L. Rev.
1122, 1168 (1975).
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the law of attempts, moreover, even at its harshest, one must at the very
least take a “substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate
in commission of the crime”—which is probably more of a nod to the
needs of police than it is consistent with the preferred standard, which
would look to the defendant’s proximity to the commission of the crime as
64
a proxy for her probability of actually committing it.
In evidence law, the fact that an individual took measures to repair
whatever defect gave rise to the tort injury cannot be introduced against
65
her —because, as the notes to the rule explain, we should favor and
encourage safety improvements, and the idea that repairing a defect
might be used against an individual at trial would deter her from pursuing
66
this aim. More generally, and powerfully, the limitation the law places
on the introduction of character evidence is perhaps the most profound
67
explicit commitment to revisability in American legal culture. As
Wigmore explains, among the reasons character evidence is excluded is
that such evidence “violates a social commitment to the thesis that each
68
person remains mentally free and autonomous at every point in [her] life.”
In criminal sentencing, remorse and acceptance of responsibility weigh
in a criminal defendant’s favor: “Many state courts have found remorse
to be an appropriate mitigating factor to consider when assigning criminal
punishment” and “many states have found the absence of remorse to be
an appropriate aggravating factor when calculating an appropriate criminal
69
punishment.” A similar principle persists under the federal sentencing
guidelines, where “a downward adjustment is made if the defendant accepts
70
responsibility for his or her offense.” Moreover, “surveying state parole
release decisions demonstrates that a prisoner’s willingness to ‘own up’ to
[her] misdeeds—to acknowledge culpability and express remorse for the
crime for which [s]he is currently incarcerated—is a vital part of the
71
parole decision-making calculus.”

64. Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate Crimes, 26 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 14–16 (1989).
65. Randolph L. Burns, Note, Subsequent Remedial Measures and Strict Products Liability: A
New—Relevant—Answer to an Old Problem, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1141, 1141–42 (1995).
66. Fed. R. Evid. 407 advisory committee’s note (“The other, and more impressive, ground for
exclusion [of evidence of subsequent remedial measures] rests on a social policy of encouraging people
to take, or at least not discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety.”).
67. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948) (explaining the doctrine).
68. 1A Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, § 54.1, at 1150–51 (Peter Tillers rev. ed. 1983).
69. Bryan H. Ward, Sentencing Without Remorse, 38 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 131, 131 (2006).
70. R. Barry Ruback & Jonathan Wroblewski, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 7 Psychol.
Pub. Pol’y & L. 739, 747 (2001); see Laura Waters, A Power and A Duty: Prosecutorial Discretion and
Obligation in United States Sentencing Guideline § 3E1.1(b), 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 813, 815 (2012); see
also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 (2012) (“If the defendant clearly demonstrates
acceptance of responsibility for [her] offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels.”).
71. Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s Dilemma: Consequences of Failing to Admit Guilt
at Parole Hearings, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 491, 493 (2008).
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Our law, in other words, has always favored takebacks. Do overs.
Road to Damascus conversions. Changes of heart. Turnabouts. Our law
is a reflection of us, and what, fundamentally, we believe. The foregoing
are only some of the many manifestations of this principle. One could
just as easily point to the statute of limitations (where the Supreme Court
has explained: “‘even wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins
72
may be forgotten’” ), the routine protection from disclosure of juvenile
records (where Professor David Pozen has explained: “many would agree
that it is good for democracy to keep certain juvenile records under seal
so that low-level offenders have a chance to enter adulthood without social
73
taint” ), or literally innumerable statutory entitlements to privacy (in
medical records, in educational records, etc.) designed fundamentally to
safeguard revisability—as examples of the ways in which our law subtly,
but importantly, favors the idea that there must be freedom to revise.
B. Revision and Privacy
Revisability and privacy are not identical, but the two concepts overlap
substantially. Privacy encompasses an enormous amalgamation of values
through a particular device, namely, investing an entitlement to control what
others may know about an individual in some manner or to some degree.
Revisability, on the other hand, is just a principle, that is, a particular kind
of aim—the aim of protecting the capacity of people to change their
commitments over time. Though one could, and some privacy scholars
have, described concern for revisability as akin to concern for “privacy over
74
time,” a more nuanced understanding is that concern for revisability is
an argument in favor of privacy in some situations, and an argument for
75
the right to have information protected, deleted, or forgotten, in others.
Because it is a compelling reason to favor privacy, exposition of an
explicit commitment to revisability forcefully appears and reappears in
the law of privacy, as the following Subpart endeavors to show. The law
of privacy could be thought of as one unified whole or as many tiles in a
greater mosaic, but for purposes of this Subpart, it will be broken up

72. Gabelli v. S.E.C., 133 S. Ct. 1216, 1221 (2013) (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985)).
73. David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 257, 287 (2010).
74. Credit for this phrase is owed to Neil Richards, Danielle Citron, and others who offered feedback
at the 2014 Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference workshop presentation of an earlier draft.
75. Just to be absolutely clear, there are many reasons to favor privacy that do not depend or even
touch upon revisability concerns. Arguments in favor of privacy range from Brandeis’ “right to be left
alone,” implicitly concerned with the way that investing individuals with privacy prevents their physical
harassment by making intruding on them unlawful (and thereby reducing the incentive to do so), to
fostering pluralism by allowing individuals to maintain certain beliefs or engage in certain practices that
are otherwise widely condemned—even though those individuals have no desire to change those beliefs
or cease engaging in those practices. Even another reason to invest individuals with privacy is to prevent
oppression by the State. Those are just three of the many arguments in favor of privacy that do not have
anything to do with revisability.
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loosely into three categories: reasonable expectations privacy, propertarian
privacy, and personhood privacy. Each discrete area of constitutional
privacy law seems to repeatedly invoke the notion that revisability is a
central constitutional value.
1. Reasonable Expectations Privacy
An official notion of reasonable expectations privacy divorced from
a propertarian conception of privacy began with Katz v. United States, where
the Court determined that the “[t]ime-honored rules of trespass need[ed]
76
to be supplemented to deal with new technology like wiretapping.” The
test in Katz has become the Fourth Amendment’s trigger, and thus marks
the beginning of the era of a unique conception of Fourth Amendment
privacy where the Amendment comes into play whenever government
77
action implicates an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”
“Reasonable expectations of privacy” privacy has always been
subtly concerned with revisability, for one of the most critical measures
of whether someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy is whether
what that individual seeks to protect is something whose dissemination
78
would significantly impinge upon her capacity to revise. Often this notion
has been enmeshed with the question of whether an individual took
appropriate steps to actually safeguard those expectations. But whether
an individual reasonably has certain expectations turns on shared notions
of what we fundamentally think should not be revealed because it might
tell the world too much about us, or tie us too closely to something with
which we would rather not forever be associated.

76. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 798 (1994).
This era was foreshadowed in a series of cases criticizing the purely propertarian conception of privacy
which had before prevailed. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (“The concept of ‘an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises,’ on which the
present decision rests seems to me beside the point. Was not the wrong . . . done when the intimacies of
the home were tapped, recorded, or revealed? The depth of the penetration of the electronic device—
even the degree of its remoteness from the inside of the house—is not the measure of the
injury”); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 139 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he search of
one’s home or office no longer requires physical entry, for science has brought forth far more effective
devices for the invasion of a person’s privacy than the direct and obvious methods of oppression which
were detested by our forebears and which inspired the Fourth Amendment”); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478–79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting it was “immaterial where the
physical connection with the telephone wires was made” what the Fourth Amendment prohibits is
“every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual”).
77. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Although the phrase
comes from Justice Marshall Harlan II’s concurring opinion, later Court opinions have taken it to distill
the essence of the Katz majority. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
78. See discussion of Maryland v. King, see infra text accompanying notes 80–88. The special
protection afforded to houses under the Fourth Amendment is also a special case. Even if an individual left
the door to her home wide open police officers would still need a warrant to walk through it. Leaving
garbage on the street in sealed opaque trash bags on the other hand, is entitled to no Fourth Amendment
protection, because what an individual is seeking to protect is literally garbage.
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The difference between whether an individual took appropriate
measures to safeguard a thing’s privacy and whether an individual actually
has an expectation of privacy in a thing because the thing itself is in its
79
nature private, has now been clearly disentangled in two recent lines of
Fourth Amendment cases, both involving the dangers posed by significant
data collection and retention: United States v. Jones and Maryland v. King.
These cases reveal that the Supreme Court is apt to conclude something—
be it information about someone, a particular place, or a particular object—
is in its nature private where that thing implicates revisability.
80
The first case, United States v. Jones, and in particular Justice Sonia
Sotomayor’s separate opinion in that case, reveal the Court’s increasing
comprehension of the interplay between individuals’ concerns with
maintaining revisability and individuals’ expectations of privacy. Jones
involved the fixing of a small GPS device on an individual’s vehicle without
a warrant, allowing the police to track its whereabouts every moment of
81
every day for weeks. Four Justices joined by Justice Sotomayor ultimately
held that a warrant was required because the police had trespassed to
82
affix the GPS device on the vehicle. Four other Justices would have held
that it was a combination of the duration of the surveillance and the amount
83
and nature of the data acquired that would have called for a warrant.
Justice Sotomayor joined both opinions, but also wrote for herself.
In writing her separate opinion in Jones, Justice Sotomayor touched
on issues deeply enmeshed with the notion of revisability. She explained
that individuals do not “reasonably expect that their movements will be
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to
ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual
84
habits, and so on.” She explained that the capacity to know or readily

79. The distinction appears overtly in the cases. Compare California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41
(1988) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash because someone who has put something in the
trash has not acted in a manner reasonably calculated to keep it private), and Rawlings v. Kentucky,
448 U.S. 98, 105–06 (1980) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in items in a friend’s purse because
someone who puts something in a friend’s purse has not acted in a manner reasonably calculated to
keep it private), with Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (no reasonable expectation of privacy
in phone number dialed because this information is not in its nature private), and Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 178–79 (1984) (open fields beyond the curtilage are not protected by the Fourth
Amendment because open fields are not in their nature private). Many cases straddle this distinction,
weighing the nature of the information that might be disclosed against the nature of the measures
taken to shield it from view. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (no reasonable expectation
of privacy against canine sniff of exterior of vehicle because such a sniff does not affect an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents detectable by a dog sniff that could conceivably be
within a car’s interior); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31–32 (2001) (thermal imaging directed at a
home is a search because a home is by its nature shielded from visual inspection).
80. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
81. Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 949 (majority opinion).
83. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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ascertain so much about a person, would “chill[] associational and
expressive freedoms” and even “‘alter the relationship between citizen
85
and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.’”
The omitted link between the “chill” on “associational and expressive
freedoms” Justice Sotomayor identified in Jones and the information the
government can infer about an individual by simply recording, storing,
and cross-referencing a great deal about them, is that knowing so much
about a person impinges on an individual’s capacity to revise who they
are. It makes that person vulnerable, and exposes her to the possibility of
manipulation and coercion. Even if she is never manipulated or coerced,
she may fear that one day she will be. In this way, Justice Sotomayor’s
explicit link between expression and expectations of privacy is bridged by an
unspoken commitment to revisability. Although Sotomayor’s concurrence
in Jones framed these concerns against the potential for abuse by the
government, the rationale she relied on—that it would chill associational
and expressive freedoms—would as readily apply to disclosure of such
detailed and personal information to any powerful institution, or to the
world at large.
In the same spiritual line of cases as Jones—those that express
concern about expectations of privacy because some things are private by
their very nature—is the recently decided Maryland v. King, where the
Supreme Court held that police may take and cross-reference the DNA
of arrestees for certain crimes against a DNA database, without a warrant,
86
upon arrest. While neither the majority nor dissenting opinions in King,
which was decided five to four, tapped into the case’s deeper revisability
stakes, at least one court, the Ninth Circuit, has done so in a case
possessing similar facts. In United States v. Kincade, a case involving an
individual who refused to submit to compulsory DNA profiling in the
87
absence of individual suspicion, two dissenting judges—Stephen Reinhardt
and Alex Kozinski—invoked revisability concerns. Judge Kozinski wrote:
“The difficult question is whether the government may exploit Kincade’s
diminished Fourth Amendment rights while he is still a probationer to
obtain his DNA signature, so it can use it in investigating thousands of
88
crimes nationwide, past and future, for the rest of Kincade’s life.” The
core of Judge Kozinski’s objection was that once Kincade’s DNA was on
file, he would never really be free again. As Judge Reinhardt wrote in his
own dissent:

85. Id. (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J.,
concurring)).
86. 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1965–66 (2013).
87. 379 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
88. Id. at 872 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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The problem with allowing the government to collect and maintain
private information about the intimate details of our lives is that the
bureaucracy most often in charge of the information “is poorly regulated
and susceptible to abuse. This [ ] has profound social effects because it
alters the balance of power between the government and the people,
exposing individuals to a series of harms, increasing their vulnerability
89
and decreasing the degree of power that they exercise over their lives.”

Judge Reinhardt identified the crucial connection between the loss of
intensely intimate unalterable information about oneself and the fear that
another’s exploitation of that information will forever diminish her
capacity for change. As Professor Daniel Solove, from whose article
Judge Reinhardt quoted, explained, pervasive surveillance impinges on
“aspects of our lives and social practices where people feel vulnerable,
uneasy, and fragile” where “the norms of social judgment are particularly
abrasive and oppressive” often relating to “our most basic needs and
desires: finances, employment, entertainment, political activity, sexuality,
90
and family.” Those seem to be issues bound up with revisability—
concerns that some fact or facts about an individual might be exposed,
leaving that individual to account for those facts forever.
The foregoing are not the only cases one could cite for the
proposition that Fourth Amendment privacy is concerned with intrusions
91
that impinge on the revisability principle. As Justice Brandeis wrote in
1928, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States: “The makers of our
Constitution . . . recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of
his feelings and of his intellect,” and so, through the Fourth Amendment,
“sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
92
emotions and their sensations.” These sentiments reflect a profound
desire to allow individuals to create conceptions of themselves through
decisions they consciously make about who they would like to be—
decisions that depend significantly on the capacity to engage in revision
and change. As the Court begins to confront the impacts of pervasive
data collection, storage, and access by the government, it will soon be
required to meet the same challenges in the private sphere.

89. Id. at 843–44 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (quoting Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the
Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1083, 1105 (2002)).
90. Solove, supra note 89, at 1122.
91. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1977) (“We are not unaware of the threat to
privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data
banks or other massive government files. The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social
security benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction of our Armed Forces, and the enforcement
of the criminal laws all require the orderly preservation of great quantities of information, much of
which is personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed. The right to collect
and use such data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory
duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures. Recognizing that in some circumstances that duty arguably has
its roots in the Constitution . . . .”).
92. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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2. Propertarian Privacy
Propertarian privacy, as the name suggests, turns on the privacy
people fashion for themselves, through legal entitlements combined with
objects such as homes, curtilages, bedrooms, automobiles, open fields,
93
and so on. Propertarian privacy, probably the most familiar brand of
privacy, involves actual concealment from view by use of objects,
occlusions, walls, and barriers. Propertarian privacy has always shown an
implicit concern for revisability. Even as far back as the seminal article
by Professor Samuel Warren and Justice Brandeis on The Right to
Privacy, the two commented that “[t]he right of property in its widest
sense . . . affords alone that broad basis upon which the protection which
94
the individual demands can be rested.” Unlike “mere” expectation of
privacy privacy, which trades on extralegal norms and often depends on
how one expects others to act, individuals have legal entitlement to
control their property, and so possess a special additional sovereign
power over it. The propertarian notion of privacy will not be overstressed,
except to note that possession and ownership of traditional property only
becomes more important in a world where almost anything that happens
in a public place can be recorded and shared precisely and permanently.
Those who can afford to obtain privacy through property can do so
often because they can withdraw from the sphere of public life. One who
may retreat into private property obtains a measure of control over
revisability immeasurably greater than one who cannot. Where one need
not go to the public pool (because she can swim in a private lake), can
attend a private school (where cell phones and Google Glass are
forbidden), can live in a comfortable home, or need not make frequent
trips to the market or the park, that individual can obtain a measure of
property-based privacy unavailable to most.
To the extent that it is believed that wealth should not dictate the
degree to which one possesses the privilege to engage in revision, the fact
that costly methods of preventing the collection and storage of information
about oneself may become the principal means available for doing so
may enhance or cement inequality.
3. Personhood Privacy
The final sphere of privacy law, the one most intensely bound up in
identity and, not coincidentally, the area replete with statements closely
reflecting a commitment to revisability, involves privacy conceived as a

93. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (home); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603,
610, 609–10 (1999) (home); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987) (curtilage of a home); Oliver
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (open fields); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (same).
94. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 211 (1890).
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95

right to personhood. Those cases—Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt
v. Baird, and Roe v. Wade, to name perhaps the biggest three—largely
96
concern sexual, reproductive, familial, and relationship autonomy. But
in so doing, all express an overriding concern with revisability through
their preoccupations with the development of an individual’s unique
personhood, conception of herself, or self-definition—what Brandeis and
97
Warren termed an individual’s “inviolate personality.”
As Justice William O. Douglas wrote, concurring in Roe, the right to
privacy grants to each person “autonomous control over the development
98
and expression of . . . [her] intellect, interests, tastes, and personality.”
His comments built upon his prior statement in Griswold, that the
“penumbra” of the First Amendment demands “not only the right to utter
or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to
read and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach—
99
indeed the freedom of the entire university community.” As Justice
Douglas explained, concurring in Eisenstadt, “[o]ur system of government
requires that we have faith in the ability of the individual to decide
100
wisely, if only [s]he is fully apprised of the merits of a controversy.”
These sentiments are not limited to Justice Douglas. Relying on the
personhood privacy cases, Justice William J. Brennan in Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees wrote, “the constitutional shelter afforded” certain especially
meaningful relationships “reflects the realization that individuals draw
much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others” and that
“[p]rotecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference
therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one’s identity
101
that is central to any concept of liberty.” As Justice Harry Blackmun
wrote, dissenting in Bowers v. Hardwick, those things protected by the
right to privacy are protected “not because they contribute, in some
direct and material way, to the general public welfare, but because they
102
form so central a part of an individual’s life.” And as Justice Anthony
Kennedy explained in Lawrence v. Texas, overruling Bowers decades later,

95. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 752 & n.93 (1989) (“Whatever
its genesis, ‘personhood’ has so invaded privacy doctrine that it now regularly is seen either as the
value underlying the right or as a synonym for the right itself.”); contra id. at 739 (arguing that
conceiving of the privacy cases as about personhood “has invariably missed the real point”).
96. Id. at 744 (“The great peculiarity of the privacy cases is their predominant, though not exclusive,
focus on sexuality.”).
97. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 94, at 205 (“The principle which protects personal writings
and all other personal productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication
in any form, is in reality not the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate personality.”).
98. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
99. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
100. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 457 (1972) (Douglass, J., concurring).
101. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
102. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), overruled by Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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“[f]reedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression,
103
and certain intimate conduct.”
Without wading deeply into the specifics of these cases—and too far
afield of the thrust of this Article—they seem to reflect a concern for the
capacity of individuals to exercise a kind of profound and deeply personal
choice, the kind of choice reflected in a notion of significant autonomy.
In this way, they also reflect a concern for revisability, as revisability is an
essential aspect of significant autonomy, for it is the capacity of individuals
to choose one life and then, if necessary, another.
The principle of revisability is a more expansive reconceptualization
of the “principle of the right to privacy” explained by Professor Jed
Rubenfeld in his article The Right of Privacy. In Professor Rubenfeld’s
view, “[t]he principle of the right to privacy is not the freedom to do
certain, particular acts determined to be fundamental through some everprogressing normative lens,” but rather “is the fundamental freedom not
to have one’s life too totally determined by a progressively more
104
normalizing state.” Professor Rubenfeld could be describing the principle
of revisability, except where Professor Rubenfeld would require that the
state do the “normalizing,” the revisability principle rests on the idea that
it does not matter where the “normalizing” comes from. Where technology
and social practices become too determinative of who an individual may
be or who they may become, the state may even have an affirmative role to
play in protecting an individual’s capacity to exercise significant autonomy.
The privacy cases seem to stand for the proposition that individuals
must remain free to revise who they are, to create a new conception of
themselves and pursue new commitments, goals, plans and projects that
have meaning to them.
C. Revision and Expression
The final jurisprudential field in which revisability has been strongly
and explicitly endorsed is within the First Amendment itself. The Supreme
Court has noted, and at times endorsed, within a First Amendment
framework, a concern for notions rooted in the capacity of individuals to
engage in revision—by thinking as they wish, by severing or forming
associations of their choosing, and by reaching conclusions on the merits of
105
the arguments presented without concern for extraneous considerations.
The first broad category where a concept implicitly rooted in
revisability appears and reappears is in the innumerable judicial statements
103. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
104. Rubenfeld, supra note 95, at 784.
105. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“At the heart of the First
Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and
beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.”).
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that the most cherished of all First Amendment freedoms is freedom of
thought. The number of juridical statements proclaiming freedom of
thought to be a paramount—even the paramount—constitutional value is
106
truly astonishing. So powerful and ingrained is the right to freedom of
thought that scholars have attempted to claim it for privacy. As Professor
Neil Richards has explained, “[t]he core of intellectual privacy is the
107
freedom of thought and belief.”
But freedom of thought is not really about privacy. Linking freedom
of thought to privacy connotes the strange supposition that individuals
have freedom of thought to the extent they keep their thoughts private.
But that cannot be right. Individuals have more than merely a right to have
whatever thoughts they wish so long as they keep those thoughts within a
carefully cultivated private sphere. A more Pickwickian understanding of
what it means to possess freedom of thought might be that it means one
has the freedom to think and consider in a tangible and meaningful manner:
to exchange and debate others in a variety of public forums in which what
is expressed cannot be recorded publicly or accessibly, or where what is
said can be segregated from the identity of the individual who says it.

106. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (“Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal.,
535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected
from the government because speech is the beginning of thought.”); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431
U.S. 209, 234–35 (1977) ( “[A]t the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should
be free to believe as [s]he will . . . .”); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“individual freedom
of mind”); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 356 (1971); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482
(1965) (“The right of freedom of speech and press includes . . . freedom of inquiry [and] freedom of
thought . . . .”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672–74 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Adler v. Bd. of Educ.,
342 U.S. 485, 508 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and
expression to everyone in our society.”); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (“Freedom of
thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men.”); Schneiderman v.
United States, 320 U.S. 118, 158 (1943) (“[F]reedom of thought . . . is a fundamental feature of our
political institutions.”); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“We think the
action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional
limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First
Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.”); id. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring)
(“The right of freedom of thought and of religion as guaranteed by the Constitution against state action
includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all . . . .”); Jones v. City of
Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 594 (1942) (“[T]he mind and spirit of man remain forever free, while his actions
rest subject to necessary accommodation to the competing needs of his fellows.”); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (stating that the freedoms of conscience and belief are absolute);
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (“[Freedom of thought] is the matrix, the indispensable
condition, of nearly every other form of freedom. With rare aberrations a pervasive recognition of that
truth can be traced in our history, political and legal.”); United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55
(1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[I]f there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls
for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought—not free thought for those who agree
with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.”); see also 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States 727 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833) (“The rights of
conscience are, indeed, beyond the just reach of any human power.”).
107. Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 387, 408 (2008).
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The second broad category where a concept implicitly rooted in
revisability appears in the First Amendment is in the concept of freedom
of association. Courts have long, though fitfully, held that implicit in the
right to associate is to have some associations shielded from scrutiny. In
NAACP v. State of Alabama, the Supreme Court protected both “freedom
to associate and privacy in one’s associations,” explaining that the NAACP
could not be compelled to disclose its membership lists where doing so
“entail[e]d the likelihood of a substantial restraint upon the exercise by
108
petitioner’s members of their right to freedom of association.”
And in a series of cases, the Supreme Court has affirmed and
reaffirmed the right of individuals to form and sever ties with organizations
109
and causes of varying degrees of intimacy. In Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, for example, the Supreme Court held that a lawyer could not
be barred from the practice of law because he had once been a member
of the Communist party, expressing as he had mere “political faith” in its
110
cause. Even in Scales v. United States, a case upholding a conviction for
membership in an organization that advocated the overthrow of the
government by force and violence, the Court held that the First Amendment
required more than mere knowledge of the organization’s aims and moral
111
support for its cause. The Court required “specific[] inten[t] to accomplish
112
(the aims of the organization) by resort to violence,” explaining that
“guilt is personal,” and thus the “relationship [between the member and
the group] must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal
113
guilt” The cases concerning association seem to flow from a recognition
that association’s value stems from a personal interest each individual
has in the development of a concept of themselves—one that is shaped
by the relationships they choose to form and to forego.
The third broad category where a concept implicitly rooted in
revisability appears in the First Amendment is in the repeated judicial
sentiments, sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit, that speech is valuable
to the extent it attempts to have its ideas adopted solely on their merits.
114
Whether it is in regulating falsehoods and deception, commercial
115
116
117
profanity,
secondary effects,
the time, place and
advertising,

108. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
109. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1400–09 (2d ed. 1988) (describing
the “dual character of associational rights,” which include both the right to associate and to dissociate).
110. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam. of State of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 244–45 (1957).
111. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224–25 (1961).
112. Id. at 229.
113. Id. at 224–25.
114. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012) (“Where false claims are made to effect a
fraud or secure moneys or other valuable considerations, say offers of employment, it is well established
that the Government may restrict speech without affronting the First Amendment.”).
115. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980)
(“The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
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manner of speech, symbolic speech or expressive conduct, the Court
has long subtly preferred speech that conveys its message in a certain
manner—reserving the highest pantheon of protection to appeals to logic
founded on evidence. This concern with the idea that the most valuable
speech is speech that persuades on the strength of its ideas depends on
an assumption that there already exists a certain kind of freedom among
individuals—namely freedom to adopt those ideas. It depends on the
capacity to engage in revision.

III. Overcoming the Case Against the Revisability Principle in
First Amendment Jurisprudence
A number of scholars see regulations aimed at preserving revisability
as inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s case law governing the freedom
120
of speech. As Professor Volokh has explained:
[I]s it constitutional for the government to suppress certain kinds of
speech in order to protect dignity, prevent disrespectful behavior,
prevent emotional distress, or to protect a supposed civil right not to be
talked about? Under current constitutional doctrine, the answer seems
to be no . . . . Even offensive, outrageous, disrespectful, and dignity121
assaulting speech is constitutionally protected.

Thus, “[w]hile privacy protection secured by contract is constitutionally
sound, broader information privacy rules are not easily defensible under

constitutionally guaranteed expression.”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 758–70 (1976). At one point in time, commercial advertising was not entitled to First
Amendment protection at all. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“[T]he Constitution
imposes no . . . restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.”).
116. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747–51 (1978) (allowing greater regulation of “vulgar,”
“offensive,” and “shocking” speech than other kinds of speech).
117. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (applying a lower standard of
scrutiny where it can be established the “predominate concern” of a content-based zoning regulation is
with the harmful secondary effects produced by the existence of the establishments, not the content
produced by the establishments themselves).
118. Heffron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650 (1981) (allowing restrictions
on pamphleteering to help maintain the orderly movement of the crowd at a fairground); Lehman v. City
of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302–303 (1974) (permitting regulation of political advertising on buses
where intrusive advertising could interfere with the city’s goal of making its buses “rapid, convenient,
pleasant, and inexpensive”); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (permitting regulation of sound
trucks); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160–61 (1939) (holding that states may limit when, where,
and how pamphleteering may be undertaken on public streets).
119. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, (1968) (“We cannot accept the view that an apparently
limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends
thereby to express an idea.”).
120. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject As Object,
52 Stan. L. Rev. 1373, 1409 (2000) (“The First Amendment argument against data privacy protection
begins by assuming that the collection, processing, and exchange of personally-identified data are
‘speech,’ and then asserts that regulation of these activities cannot survive the requisite scrutiny.”).
121. Volokh, supra note 16, at 1113.

Tutt_18 (EGK) - CORRECTED (1) (Do Not Delete)

1146

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

5/20/2015 11:43 PM

[Vol. 66:1113

122

existing free speech law.” Similarly, Professor Bambauer has argued,
“the freedom of speech carries an implicit right to create knowledge” and,
as such, “[w]hen the government deliberately interferes with an individual’s
effort to learn something new, that suppression of disfavored knowledge
123
is presumptively illegitimate and must withstand judicial scrutiny.”
These arguments are not insubstantial. While the law in this area is
still evolving, there are several seminal First Amendment cases that lend
substantial support to the contention that most data gathering, indexing,
storage, and sharing cannot be constitutionally regulated, even if, in the
aggregate, it results in potentially substantial harms to revisability. Indeed,
it is not at all implausible to think that under the law as it is, nearly all
efforts to restrict the collection and free alienation of information are
unconstitutional.
The leading case is a 2011 decision, Sorrell v. IMS Health, involving
a Vermont law that “restrict[ed] the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy
124
records that reveal[ed] the prescribing practices of individual doctors.”
The Supreme Court struck down the law as imposing content- and
speaker-based restrictions on speech because it limited who could obtain
prescriber identifying information largely on the grounds of what that
125
entity would choose to do with it. In reaching its conclusion, in a holding
of breathtaking scope, the Court held that “the creation and dissemination
of information are speech” for purposes of the First Amendment, indeed
126
that “information is speech” for purposes of the First Amendment, as
“[f]acts, after all, are the beginning point for much of the speech that is
most essential to advance human knowledge and to conduct human
127
affairs.” Thus, that the Vermont legislature sought to choose which
entities could have access to information, in the Court’s view, struck at
the First Amendment’s core concern with content neutrality, favoring
some entities over others because of what they wished to say.
Sorrell is not some jurisprudential pariah. Some of the most
celebrated cases in First Amendment law endorse sweeping principles
nigh indistinguishable from those embraced by the Sorrell Court—most
of all, that public debate should remain “uninhibited, robust, and wide128
open” even at substantial cost to the dignitary or revisability of

122. Id. at 1112.
123. Bambauer, supra note 15, at 60.
124. 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011).
125. Id. at 2663.
126. Id. at 2667; see also Andrew Tutt, Software Speech, 65 Stan. L. Rev. Online 73, 74 (2012)
(“[A] holding so broad and potentially far-reaching that the Court could not possibly have literally
meant what it said.”).
127. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667.
128. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (“[W]e consider this case against the
background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
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interests of those singled out for scrutiny. Those cases warrant serious
attention—they give rightful pause to anyone too quick to embrace a
world where the government might impose limits on what information
can be captured, stored, or shared. Even prominent privacy scholars take
this view. As Professor Richards has written, “[t]o the extent that it has
considered privacy at all, traditional First Amendment theory has assumed
it to be a conflicting and inferior value that has little place in free speech
130
theory.”
But to understand why those claims are overstated, and how
revisability figures into the First Amendment, one must understand that
most of First Amendment law depends, to a remarkable degree, on framing.
Consider the First Amendment’s first principles. The First
Amendment is designed to preserve the right of individuals to seek and
spread ideas that the government wants to obliviate. That is its fundamental
role. The government might have many motives for attempting to curtail
131
the free exchange of ideas —protecting those in power from public
132
scrutiny or accountability; ensuring the adoption of a particular political,
133
social or cultural orthodoxy; rewarding a favored constituency or
134
punishing a disfavored constituency; preventing the spread of information

uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”).
129. Id. at 279–80 (creating the “actual malice” standard for defamation of a “public official”).
130. Richards, supra note 107, at 392.
131. See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 414 (1996) (explaining the relevance of motive in First
Amendment law).
132. See, e.g., Sedition Act ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (imposing a punishment of up to two years
imprisonment for libeling the government); see also Paul Finkelman, Cultural Speech and Political
Speech in Historical Perspective, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 717, 722 n.25 (1999) (reviewing David M. Rabban, Free
Speech in Its Forgotten Years (1997)) (“In years following the expiration of the Sedition Act almost
all Americans came to accept that the law was wrong and unconstitutional. As the Supreme Court
noted in New York Times v. Sullivan, the Sedition Act has been overruled by ‘the court of history.’”).
133. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (“[T]he only interest distinctively
served by the content limitation is that of displaying the city council’s special hostility towards the
particular biases thus singled out.”); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (explaining that speech may not be restricted “merely because public officials
disapprove the speaker’s views”); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“[N]o
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion . . . .”).
134. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951) (upholding convictions of members
of the Communist Party on the grounds of the “evil” they posed); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919) (developing and applying a “clear and present danger” test to uphold the convictions of
socialist who opposed World War I); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (same); Debs v.
United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212 (1919) (finding Eugene V. Debs, a five time Socialist party presidential
candidate, guilty under the Espionage Act of attempting to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment
service of the United States). Under the Debs test, speech was unprotected if “one purpose of the
speech, whether incidental or not does not matter, was to oppose [this] war . . . and that the opposition
was so expressed that its natural and intended effect would be to obstruct recruiting.” Id. at 214–15.
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that might cause alarm, anger, or panic; preserving existing hierarchies
136
or power structures in society; or reinforcing certain taboos, norms, and
137
expectations about how people should live their lives.
Yet all of the impermissible motives described above can be flipped,
counterbalanced, and often overcome by an enormous range of public138
spirited motives—regulating the time, place, and manner of speech;
ensuring promotion of certain ideals, beliefs, or causes thought to be
139
consistent with the nation’s core commitments or national ideals;
140
prohibiting conduct that incites violence or causes public disturbance;
141
prohibiting the desecration or destruction of certain property or symbols;
prohibiting attacks on individuals that are harmful to their dignity,
142
emotional well-being, or reputations; prohibiting manipulation, coercion,

135. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (holding that the
government could not withhold release of the Pentagon Papers on the basis of harms to national
security flowing from disclosure).
136. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010) (“The
Government may not by these means deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine for
itself what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration.”); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512
U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“Laws of this sort pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to
advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate
the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49
(1976) (explaining that “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment”).
137. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (holding that the government cannot
restrict pornography for adults); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (holding that obscenity
laws must “be limited to works . . . which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way”).
138. Compare, e.g., Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680–83 (1992)
(upholding regulations that banned the solicitation of funds inside airport terminals because of the
dangers inherent in solicitation and the inconvenience to passengers of the activity), with Bd. of Airport
Comm’rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574–75 (1987) (striking down a regulation
prohibiting any person “to engage in First Amendment activities within the Central Terminal Area at
Los Angeles International Airport” because if read to mean what it actually said, the regulation
“prohibit[ed] even talking and reading, or the wearing of campaign buttons or symbolic clothing”).
139. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (“When Congress established a National
Endowment for Democracy . . . it was not constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage
competing lines of political philosophy . . . .”); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 95 (1961) (finding it
constitutional for a State to refuse to admit an individual to practice law who refused to affirm or deny
whether he had ever been a member of the Communist Party).
140. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (limiting prohibitions on speech
advocating use of force or violation of law to situations “where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971) (holding that a disturbing the peace conviction cannot be founded on hostility to
constitutionally protected speech); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (same).
141. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (upholding a ban on cross burning). But see, e.g., Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (striking down prohibition on flag burning).
142. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976) (“States [can, consistent with the
First Amendment] . . . base [tort] awards on elements other than injury to reputation,” such as
“personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.”); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S.
234, 245–46 (2002) (“The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of
speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real children.”);
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fraud, and deception; prohibiting speech that can cause significant
144
harm, by, for instance, facilitating crime, or endangering the welfare of
145
the nation; limiting the disclosure of facts the occur during sensitive
146
official proceedings or deliberation; and, most important for present
purposes, limiting the disclosure of private facts and information about
147
an individual.
When a First Amendment question is asked, the very values that a
law seeks to vindicate can often also be the strongest reasons to strike it
down. Thus the framing problem—the question in many First Amendment
cases is whether the values the law seeks to protect are legitimate and
likely to be achieved. Does a law subsidizing patriotic curriculum materials
impermissibly attempt to force individuals to accept a particular social and
cultural orthodoxy or does it permissibly promote certain national ideals
and causes? Does a law against whistleblowing unconstitutionally prevent
public speech and debate about a national public issue or prevent speech
that would endanger the welfare of the nation? Does a campaign finance
regulation preserve existing hierarchies or power structures in society or
help to ensure equal access to them? Does a law requiring that internet
platforms honor user requests to delete information they have posted

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (holding State may criminalize possession and dissemination
of child pornography because of its harm to victims).
143. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012) (“Where false claims are made to effect
a fraud or secure moneys or other valuable considerations, say offers of employment, it is well established
that the Government may restrict speech without affronting the First Amendment.”).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008) (“Offers to engage in illegal
transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.”); Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
145. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (sustaining passport revocation based on disclosures
of intelligence operations and names of intelligence personnel); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507
(1980) (sustaining requirement that past and present CIA employees submit anything they write about
intelligence activities to the agency for review).
146. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (sustaining power of courts to
restrain litigants from disclosing the contents of pretrial discovery); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (exclusion of press and public from courtroom during testimony of minor
victim of sex offense violates First Amendment); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979)
(denial of access to pretrial hearing did not violate First Amendment); Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns,
Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) (no right of access to Nixon tapes).
147. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001) (strongly implying that federal wiretap
act is constitutional in the classic case of a eavesdropping on a private call). But see Smith v. Daily Mail
Publ’g, 443 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1979) (holding that a newspaper could not be criminally punished for
publishing the name of a fourteen-year-old girl accused of murdering a classmate); Okla. Publ’g Corp.
v. Okla. Cnty. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 311–12 (1977) (striking down a state court injunction prohibiting
the news media from publishing the name or photograph of an eleven-year-old boy who was being
tried before a juvenile court); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494–95 (1975) (holding that
damages could not be recovered against a newspaper for publishing the name of a rape victim); Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 394 (1967) (rejecting privacy-based challenges to the publication of personal
information on First Amendment grounds).
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impermissibly limit what those platforms can say and how they can say it,
or does it help to ensure individual autonomy?
Not every First Amendment question is like those listed above—
because not every First Amendment case is hard. From even a glance at the
foregoing list of points and counterpoints, permissible and impermissible
purposes, it is apparent why certain First Amendment questions are treated
as easy. In some cases there are no equally weighty values falling on the
positive side of the ledger. That fact explains why the lower federal
courts have been unanimous in determining that police officers may be
148
recorded while undertaking their official duties in a public place. None
of the permissible public values line up in favor of restrictions on such
recordings, while several of the impermissible motives for restricting
149
speech freedom are easily found in such restrictions.
It is precisely because no clearly articulable public values support
restricting the rights of individuals to record police that the First Circuit
was able to surefootedly explain in the 2011 case Glik v. Cunniffe that
“[b]asic First Amendment principles, along with case law from this and
other circuits” “unambiguously” dictate holding that there is “a
constitutionally protected right to videotape police carrying out their
150
duties in public.” And for the same reason, in 2012, the Seventh Circuit
announced confidently in ACLU v. Alvarez:
The act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily
included within the First Amendment’s guarantee of speech and press
rights as a corollary of the right to disseminate the resulting recording.
The right to publish or broadcast an audio or audiovisual recording would
be insecure, or largely ineffective, if the antecedent act of making the
recording is wholly unprotected, as the State’s Attorney insists. By way
of a simple analogy, banning photography or note-taking at a public
event would raise serious First Amendment concerns; a law of that sort
would obviously affect the right to publish the resulting photograph or
disseminate a report derived from the notes. The same is true of a ban
151
on audio and audiovisual recording.

148. See Andrew Rosado Shaw, Our Duty in Light of the Law’s Irrelevance: Police Brutality and
Civilian Recordings, 20 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 161, 175 (2012) (“The Federal Courts of
Appeals have uniformly resolved this discrepancy in favor of First Amendment rights, holding that
such applications of state wiretapping laws are unconstitutional.”); see also Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d
1, 9 (1st Cir. 2014) (finding that an individual’s right to film “police carrying out their duties in public”
is a clearly established First Amendment right). Cases holding that there is an almost absolute
unqualified right to film police officers have begun to blossom across the federal courts.
149. See Will Baude, Is There Any Good Argument Against the Right to Record the Cops?, Volokh
Conspiracy (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/08/18/
is-there-any-good-argument-against-the-right-to-record-the-cops (explaining that Professor Will
Baude had been able to come up with four arguments against a right to record police, all of which
were “pretty weak”).
150. 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011).
151. 679 F.3d 583, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651, (2012).
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Of course, the language in these decisions, sweeping and self-assured as
it is, might make it seem as though the case against privacy in any public
place is an open and shut one—that is, there simply isn’t any. One could
hardly fault Professors Volokh and Bambauer for so concluding. The
justifications in these cases for allowing police officers to be videotaped
are expounded so sweepingly they could be used to justify striking down
restrictions on recording nearly anything that happens, anywhere it can
be recorded.
But First Amendment cases tend to invite a special sort of bombast
and embroidery, a romanticism inconsistent with what the cases actually
do when the chips fall. One need only recall Justice Robert H. Jackson’s
line from West Virginia v. Barnette that “no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
152
other matters of opinion,” or Justice Harlan’s comment in Cohen v.
153
California that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric,” or Justice Hugo
154
Black’s assertion that “no law means no law” (even when Justice Black
155
joined Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Cohen) —to see that not everything
that is said in a First Amendment case can be taken to mean what it says.
Indeed, as the dueling list of permissible and impermissible motives
reveals, all that can really be concluded with confidence from the Court’s
intertwined and enmeshed concerns with public values, on one side, and
protection of uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate on the other, is
that things are murkier than any individual decision portends them to be.
The real concern going forward—for those who care deeply about
retaining a space for revisability going forward—is context.
Revisability, as a distinct and important value, only arises in cases
where it forms a component of the compelling government interest
underlying a law; but where it does form such a component, those cases
often come out in favor of revisability, or at least often balance it
strongly against the countervailing interest in the dissemination of
truthful information. These cases, which range across a constellation of
areas—some of which were already discussed in preceding Parts—
include cases concerning government secrets, restrictions on disclosing
sensitive deliberations to the public, restrictions on child pornography,
regulating what may occur within particular “forums,” and protecting
against defamation and harassment.

152. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
153. 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
154. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717–18 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring) (“The Solicitor General has carefully and emphatically stated: ‘Now, Mr. Justice
[BLACK], your construction of . . . [the First Amendment] is well known, and I certainly respect it.
You say that no law means no law’ . . . .”).
155. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Professor Volokh has argued that the problem with recognizing
countervailing constitutional values to be set against uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open public debate, is that the list of such values could be
limitless and pretextual. The government could conjure rights out of the
blue, and just “declare it to be my ‘civil right;’ to prohibit others from
156
saying the truth about me behind my back.”
But that danger appears overblown, especially when the
constitutional value identified—the revisability principle—is in the cases.
It does not appear out of thin air. The Court has affirmed and reaffirmed
it, treating it as a compelling counterargument to the notion that anything
157
can be said about anyone, at any time. When it can be observed over
and over that a coherent discernable constitutional value exists—a concern
with preserving the capacity of individuals to engage in revision of their
identities throughout their lives by not having certain information about
them kept, recorded, or made accessible—it is difficult to agree with
Professor Volokh’s conclusion that scholars, lawyers, and courts will be
able to just make them up as they go.
The same counterargument can be made to Professor Volokh’s
contention that recognizing and enforcing a countervailing principle in
opposition to unfettered speech freedom will lead to a slippery slope
problem by making it easier to accept illegitimate restrictions on speech.
After all, the principle of revisability has already functioned as a discrete
justification for placing limits on individuals’ capacities to engage in
158
unfettered information gathering throughout American history. Thus,
the argument that recognizing limits on the ability of individuals to
record anything they choose whenever they choose will make it “much
easier for people to accept ‘codes of fair reporting,’ ‘codes of fair debate,’
‘codes of fair filmmaking,’ ‘codes of fair political criticism,’ and the
159
like” is probably overstated. Revisability has been a value integral to
the First Amendment since its inception and yet we have not slipped
down the slope. To the extent more laws may need to be passed—and
the state may need to take a more active role in preserving revisability
going forward—that would be an effort to preserve a constitutional

156. Volokh, supra note 16, at 1114.
157. The clearest explicit articulation of the principle and its relationship to recording technology
probably appeared in the dissenting opinions of Justices Douglas and Harlan in the Fourth
Amendment confidential informant case United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 764–65, 787–88 (1971).
The principle also appeared explicitly in the challenge to the constitutionally of the federal wiretapping
laws in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518 (2001). The lines of cases dealing with sensitive
deliberations and confidential information—with their concern for candor—have the principle within
them, if only by extension, as do the cases dealing with freedom of thought and association. For more
discussion of these and other cases, see supra Part II.
158. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
159. Volokh, supra note 16, at 1116.
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160

equilibrium that we already have. It would not necessarily be a slide
down an incline.
This also provides a full answer to Professor Bambauer’s contention
that efforts “to preserve the information status quo . . . clash with the
161
First Amendment.” That superficially reasonable-sounding claim is in
fact highly contestable. Preservation of the information status quo cannot
clash with the First Amendment unless the First Amendment is
understood in a particular way, namely, to unilaterally favor a certain
distribution of information in society. Yet, the society in which we now
live came after the Amendment was drafted, and involves technology the
162
“Framers of the First Amendment surely did not foresee.” The First
Amendment cannot, of its own force, dictate what the information balance
of an information society it was never designed to operate within should
be. To understand that efforts to preserve the information status quo
clash with the First Amendment is to put forward a theory of the First
Amendment. But to the extent Professor Bambauer draws on First
Amendment principles in making her claim that the First Amendment
unilaterally favors a society that does not care much for revisability, this
Article is an effort to show that is an uncharitable view. The revisability
principle forms an integral part of the same First Amendment tradition
in which Professor Bambauer’s information-affine First Amendment also
resides.

IV. The Impact of Technological Change on the
Revisability Principle
There is good reason to suspect that new information technologies
are so different in degree from those that have come before that they are
in fact different in kind. There is no doubt that technology is becoming
more scrutinizing and more granular in its capacity to record, store,
index, and make accessible everything that happens:
Every search, query, click, page view, and link are logged, retained,
analyzed, and used by a host of third parties, including websites (also
known as “publishers”), advertisers, and a multitude of advertising
intermediaries, including ad networks, ad exchanges, analytics providers,
re-targeters, market researchers, and more. Although users may expect
that many of their online activities are anonymous, the architecture of
the Internet allows multiple parties to collect data and compile user
163
profiles with various degrees of identifying information.

160. Kerr, supra note 5 (arguing that Fourth Amendment law is best explained as a persistent
intergenerational effort to preserve the nation’s privacy equilibrium).
161. Bambauer, supra note 15, at 60.
162. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518 (2001).
163. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or “Do Not Track”: Advancing Transparency and
Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 281, 282 (2012).
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As such, the claim that technological self-protection, coupled with robust
property rights, will result in a world “where much of our privacy can be
164
[meaningfully] protected” seems aspirational, or, at the very least,
inconsistent with the facts that are developing—which reveal a world in
which individuals feel less and less in control over what they disclose
about themselves (let alone what is known about them) in everything
that they do, think, and say.
There is no doubt that individuals feel revisability is already
frequently at stake in their use of digital technologies. “Internet users
routinely hide information by making it invisible to search engines, using
pseudonyms and multiple profiles, and taking advantage of privacy
settings. Individuals rely almost reflexively on the obscurity created by
165
these techniques to protect their privacy in daily life.” An insistent
question raised by the fact that so many individuals feel a desire, even a
need, to make themselves obscure on the Internet is whether it is
preferable to live in a world where they must do so. The intercession of
law more deeply into the digital world could significantly reduce the need
to engage in costly efforts to keep one’s activities private, and thereby
preserve revisability without forcing individuals to operate fearing that
they have taken insufficient precautions to ensure that their obscurity has
in fact been preserved.
Moreover, the problems of the Internet now stand poised to cross
the threshold. They stand on the verge of making the critical leap to the
physical world. Internet connected devices are becoming integrally
enmeshed in the physical objects around us. Everything will have a
microphone soon: not just the cellular phone, but also the refrigerator,
the television, and the kitchen sink. All of these devices will be networked
together, and connected to the cloud. That will be the society’s default
setting—and it should be, as it will improve modern life enormously. But
it will mean that everything around us, all the time, will either be
capturing or capable of capturing everything that happens, and storing it
somewhere. This will be a feature of every public and private place. It
will be built into the walls of the world.
Exposure by itself does not necessarily impinge on revisability. This
is the difference between Justice Brandeis’s worry about newspapers and
cameras 115 years ago and the problems posed by the technology of the
world today. Mere capture is not enough to significantly impinge on
revisability. It is permanence and easy access, which are powerful enough
to largely subsume and replace the need for human memory, that stand
to impinge on revisability in a new and incredibly significant way. In the

164. Volokh, supra note 16, at 1111.
165. Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 Calif. L. Rev. 1,
2–3 (2013).
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modern world, individuals already feel those pressures knowing anyone
anywhere could take out a cell phone, snap a photo, upload it to the
166
Internet, and tag them in it. But even that procedure is infinitely more
costly than the procedure that is coming, where Google Glass and other
passive data collection-retention-indexing devices will become so pervasive,
so built into everything, that anyone who wishes to will be able to find
images, voice samples, jottings, meanderings, mutterings, eye-rolls, slips,
and spills that have been recorded somewhere.
To the obscurantists, the technological pessimist-optimists who
argue that in a world of so much data everything will be obscure, it
should be noted that this vastly underestimates the power of computers
and their cleverness. Searching an individual’s name alongside even a
few search terms will make it easy enough to find what one is looking for.
Imagine a search for “[name’s] most embarrassing moment.” The algorithm
will come up with something. Almost certainly, it will be embarrassing.
The interesting question all of this raises, is of course, whether
individuals, being infinitely adaptable, will adapt to this world as well.
Probably they will, but this is not a full answer to whether an individual’s
capacity to engage in revision will be impinged by these technological
advances, or whether, therefore, her capacity to exercise significant
autonomy will in some significant way be destroyed. Human beings lived
for thousands of years in near starvation conditions, managing nonetheless
to find happiness and fulfillment in that existence, at least episodically, at
least often enough to perpetuate themselves. But we would hardly argue
that we would choose to return to that world, where individual choice
167
was so greatly diminished.
The fast evolution of modern technology and its interaction with the
First Amendment is forcing us to confront choices about what law requires
and what values the law should express. And the great irony of the modern
debate is that those who favor unfettered First Amendment protection
for the collection, retention, and dissemination of information about
everyone all the time, seem to be arguing against autonomy in the name
of freedom. Perhaps at least all sides could agree that revisability is, in
principle, valuable.

V. Operationalizing the Revisability Principle
Suppose it was taken as true that the revisability principle was
something the government had a compelling interest in protecting. Two
consequences might flow from that. First, under existing First Amendment

166. “Tagging” is how users identify individuals in photographs or comments posted on certain
social media sites.
167. Waldron, Autonomy and Perfectionism, supra note 30, at 1122 (explaining that significant
authonomy could be considered “unconditionally as one of the advances of modern life”).
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scrutiny analysis, its regulations narrowly tailored to protect revisability
would be constitutional. Second, and more importantly, however, it
might be that revisability is so compelling and so difficult to protect
through narrowly tailored laws that allowing the government a reduction
in scrutiny for laws intended to safeguard revisability may be appropriate.
In particular, a balancing analysis that weighs the state’s asserted interest
against the degree of imposition on the speech interests affected might
be superior to strict scrutiny where the regulation is meant to safeguard
revisability—even if the regulation is content-based.
This second method is the one I favor, but it does raise serious
questions. The First Amendment possesses manifold strict scrutiny triggers,
grounded in whether statutes make certain kinds of distinctions, either
between content, viewpoint, or speaker. Content-neutral regulations, on
the other hand, need only meet a lower scrutiny threshold.
A threshold question is whether it is even meaningful to try to parse
content-based versus content-neutral regulation. Not only has it become
exceedingly difficult in recent decades to disentangle the difference
between such regulations, but the methodology is also poorly tailored
where content- and speaker-based restrictions on speech would be the
most effective means of eliminating harms to a core First Amendment
value such as revisability while otherwise preserving the broadest
possible protections for public speech. Individuals should be able to take
photos of their friends in public, and store and playback video and audio
of what they see around them. But major institutions—the intermediaries
who can control, store forever, cross-reference, index, and aggregate
everything that is known—pose the greatest threat to revisability for
precisely the reasons Justice Sotomayor gave in her concurrence in
Jones. It is the fact that institutional players—in Jones the government, in
the rest of the world the large data institutions that will become the power
brokers and robber barons of the digital gilded age—can put all of the
pieces of the mosaic together, and create a binding, permanent, and
inescapable portrait of a person, that makes those institution capable of
impinging so profoundly on an individual’s capacity to engage in revision.
Second, a balancing of interests approach, rather than strict scrutiny,
in cases implicating serious revisability concerns, appears to be an
appropriate path forward. The Supreme Court has been vacillating on
the balancing question in recent years, with an intense fight occurring
both among the Justices and across time in opinions addressing distinct
168
First Amendment categories. As a matter of aspiration, the Court has
attempted repeatedly to emphatically reject balancing as an appropriate

168. See Laurence Tribe & Joshua Matz, Uncertain Justice: The Roberts Court and the
Constitution 121–53 (2014) (explaining the Court’s recent conflicts over these issues).
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169

means of addressing First Amendment questions. In United States v.
Stevens, Justice John Roberts, writing for a nearly unanimous court (only
Justice Samuel Alito dissented), explained that a balancing test, “[a]s a
free-floating test for First Amendment coverage . . . is startling and
dangerous. The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not
extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of
170
relative social costs and benefits.” In subsequent cases, the Court has
171
either cited that proposition approvingly or done its best to follow it.
However, at least some members of the Court appear committed to
the view that balancing plays (or should play) an important role in
deciding First Amendment questions in several areas. As Justice Stephen
Breyer, joined by Justice Elena Kagan, explained in a concurrence in the
judgment in United States v. Alvarez:
Regardless of the label, some [type of balancing] approach is necessary
if the First Amendment is to offer proper protection in the many instances
in which a statute adversely affects constitutionally protected interests
but warrants neither near-automatic condemnation (as “strict scrutiny”
implies) nor near-automatic approval (as is implicit in “rational basis”
172
review).

Justice Breyer has expressed a similar view across a series of cases, including
in his dissent in Sorrell (joined by Justices Kagan and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg), and in his concurrence in Bartnicki v. Vopper, two of the most
important cases bearing on the kinds of First Amendment questions that
173
courts will increasingly confront in the digital age.

169. See Laurence Tribe, Free Speech and the Roberts Court: Uncertain Protections, Volokh
Conspiracy (June 3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/03/
free-speech-and-the-roberts-court-uncertain-protections (“Thus, while upholding borderline speech
claims that involve significant social harms and barely implicate concerns of political censorship, the
Court has condemned just the sort of common law interest-balancing that manifestly animates what it
has actually done in [Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project], Beard [v. Banks], Morse [v. Frederick], and
Garcetti [v. Ceballos]. In a booming voice, the Court has declared itself scandalized—scandalized!—by
the notion that courts can be trusted to play a role in reshaping First Amendment rights.”).
170. 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010).
171. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012); Brown v. Entm’t Merchants
Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011).
172. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2552.
173. Sorrell v. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2679 (2011) (“In short, the case law in this area reflects
the need to ensure that the First Amendment protects the ‘marketplace of ideas,’ thereby facilitating
the democratic creation of sound government policies without improperly hampering the ability of
government to introduce an agenda, to implement its policies, and to favor them to the exclusion of
contrary policies.”); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536 (2001) (“I would ask whether the statutes
strike a reasonable balance between their speech-restricting and speech-enhancing consequences. Or
do they instead impose restrictions on speech that are disproportionate when measured against their
corresponding privacy and speech-related benefits, taking into account the kind, the importance, and
the extent of these benefits, as well as the need for the restrictions in order to secure those benefits?”).
See generally Andrew Tutt, The New Speech, 41 Hastings Const. L.Q. 235, 296 (2014) (discussing the
kinds of First Amendment tensions that are likely to arise in the next century).
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Though the Court has ostensibly rejected balancing, the center
cannot hold. Technological change is happening too rapidly for the Court
to wed itself to “historical practices” that have little applicability to the
world that is forming, or principles articulated at high levels of
174
generality—levels of generality that are, in retrospect, far too broad.
Balancing is the methodology of the common law. It is a minimalist, allthings-considered approach. Ordinarily, under traditional rational basis
review, Courts would not even permit themselves to meddle that far into
legislative policymaking. As such, balancing strikes a balance of its own—
between transforming the courts into an obstacle to sensible legislation
meant to safeguard important First Amendment values, and retaining
their role as a meaningful break and a check on overeager legislators
bent on protecting individual privacy without considering all of the possible
consequences. That partnership model of First Amendment development
in cases where a threshold showing has been made that the justification
for the law is the preservation of revisability, could navigate between the
Scylla of judicial obstruction and the Charybdis of legislative excess.
A final note is that this test would not alter the First Amendment’s
core. The courts are amply capable of distinguishing between cases that
clearly impinge on an individual’s right to share and receive ideas
without countervailing justifications, save the speaker’s disfavored status
or message (banning sex offenders from Twitter, for example), and laws
designed to further the important individual interest in preserving
revisability (such as a law requiring Twitter to allow individuals an
opportunity to delete “tweets,” or barring Google from storing Google
Glass video on its servers forever). Currently, courts would treat all three
of these laws as subject to the same constitutional test—strict scrutiny—
and would almost certainly strike down all three. That seems not only
wrong, but inconsistent with the overriding concern for revisability built
into American law and American culture.
If balancing became the test, line drawing problems would arise.
They always do. But a flexible test that allows for the preservation of a
value as built into the very fabric of American culture as revisability
seems a better way forward than to simply give up on the idea that
revisability is a significant constitutional value. Especially because it is
one that, increasingly, only legislation can realize.

174. On this measure, consider the far-too-sweeping language quoted in an earlier Part in ACLU v.
Alvarez. See Tutt, supra note 126 (arguing against First Amendment tests rooted in historical analogies or
literalism and in favor of First Amendment inquiry into the cultural position of particular speech in society).
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Conclusion
The overarching purpose of this Article was to name and explain a
latent constitutional value, the revisability principle. It strove to show
that the revisability principle is embedded in the Constitution and has
long been recognized as essential to the right to freedom of expression.
To the extent individuals must forever account for decisions in the
distant past—people they in some sense no longer are—their freedom to
be who they choose to be is powerfully constrained. This Article’s
ultimate aim was to reveal the centrality of the revisability principle to
the right to freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. Judges
confronting a regulations meant to safeguard revisability will increasingly
face a difficult tension between First Amendment doctrine and that
important First Amendment value. Critical to any proper First Amendment
analysis going forward will be consideration of the degree to which changing
context means doctrines developed for another time and technological
world will have to be adapted to fit a new one where, without law,
everything that happens will be known.
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